News credibility labels have limited but uneven effects on news diet quality and fail to reduce misperceptions*

Kevin Aslett[a], Andrew M. Guess[b], Jonathan Nagler[a,c], Richard Bonneau[a,d], and Joshua A. Tucker[a,c]

[a]Center for Social Media and Politics, New York University
[b]Department of Politics, Princeton University
[c]Wilf Family Department of Politics, New York University
[d]Department of Biology, New York University

Revise and Resubmit at *Science Advances*.

Abstract

As the primary arena for viral misinformation shifts toward transnational threats such as the Covid-19 pandemic, the search continues for scalable, lasting countermeasures compatible with principles of transparency and free expression. To advance scientific understanding and inform future interventions, we conducted a randomized field experiment evaluating the impact of source credibility labels embedded in users' social feeds and search results pages. By combining representative surveys ($N = 3,337$) and digital trace data ($N = 946$) from a subset of respondents, we provide a rare ecologically valid test of such an intervention on both attitudes and behavior. On average across the sample, we are unable to detect changes in real-world consumption of news from low-quality sources after three weeks, and we can rule out even small effects on perceived accuracy of popular misinformation spread about the Black Lives Matter movement and Covid-19. However, we present suggestive evidence of a substantively meaningful increase in news diet quality among the heaviest consumers of misinformation in our sample. We discuss the implications of our findings for practical questions about designing interventions to counteract online misinformation.

*We are extremely grateful to Craig Newmark Philanthropies for supporting this research project. The Center for Social Media and Politics at New York University is generously supported by funding from the National Science Foundation, the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation, the Charles Koch Foundation, the Hewlett Foundation, Craig Newmark Philanthropies, the Siegel Family Endowment, and NYU's Office of the Provost and Global Institute for Advanced Study. NewsGuard did not consult with the authors on the study design or provide funding support for this research. This study has been approved by the Princeton University Institutional Review Board (#12800) and the New York University Institutional Review Board (#FY2020-4278). Special thanks to Sam Luks at YouGov for facilitating data collection. We thank Tali Mendelberg for helpful feedback.

The internet and social media have drastically decreased the cost of disseminating information by reducing reliance on traditional gatekeepers. As a consequence of this openness and availability, news and information sources have flourished from a variety of ideological and cultural perspectives. The resulting cacophony has encouraged participation by previously underrepresented voices and enabled criticism of dominant authorities. At the same time, it has intersected with existing political divides in ways that have contributed to pathologies in American political discourse including the spread of misinformation (Lazer et al. 2018; Vosoughi et al. 2018; Grinberg et al. 2019; Guess et al. 2019; Osmundsen et al. ming), disagreements about basic facts related to governance and policy (Flynn et al. 2017; Anspach et al. 2019; Pennycook and Rand 2021), and lowered trust in established media (Guess et al. 2021). Of particular concern is the possibility that these problems are interlinked: As political divisions widen, partisan media alienate people from authoritative sources, which could make it more difficult to counteract potentially corrosive — and in the case of public health during a pandemic, life-threatening (Brennen et al. 2020) — misinformation.

Over the past several years, scholars, technologists and policy makers have proposed a number of solutions intended to reduce exposure to misleading information. These range from relatively intrusive measures such as algorithmic downranking, to subtle warnings and labels targeted at specific factual claims (Ecker et al. 2010; Clayton et al. 2019a), to general efforts to boost digital media literacy skills (Guess et al. 2020b; Badrinathan 2020). A key challenge in these efforts is how to balance the strength of an intervention with potential negative externalities in the form of unintended spillover effects (Pennycook et al. 2020; Nyhan et al. 2013) or limits on individual autonomy and freedom of expression. With this tension in mind, we focus on simple feedback in the form of informational labels designed to educate people about the quality of sources that they consume and view in their search or social media feeds (Lorenz-Spreen et al. 2020). This approach builds on humans' tendency to rely on cognitive shortcuts and heuristics, which depending on context can be relatively informative (in the case of source transparency; see Gigerenzer and Selten 2002; Pennycook and Rand 2019) or potentially distorting (in the case of popularity cues, which are a common feature of social media; see Messing and Westwood 2014). In addition to being scalable relative to fact-checks, source labels are relevant for a broad array of publishers across the spectrum of reliability, rather than merely those designated as purveyors of misinformation.

In this study, we build on recent innovations for rigorously evaluating online tools (Munzert et al. 2021a,b). In an online field experiment, we randomly encouraged participants to install a prominent web browser extension, NewsGuard, which embeds straightforward source-level indicators of news reliability into users' search engine results pages (SERPs), social feeds and visited URLs.[1] Different "shield" symbols are placed

[1]NewsGuard launched in 2018 and produces ratings based on neutral criteria evaluated by a team of journalists and editors; more information can be found in the Materials and Methods section and at `www.newsguardtech.com`. Examples of how the source ratings appear to news consumers in different settings are shown in Fig. **??**. Although this study employed the

in-feed to provide visual summaries of sources' quality. A green shield indicates a reliable source (examples include CNN, Fox News, and *The Washington Post*), a red shield indicates an unreliable source (examples include Gateway Pundit, *Epoch News*, and Daily Kos), a gray shield indicates a source with user-generated content (such as YouTube, Wikipedia, and Reddit), and a gold shield represents satire (such as *The Onion*, *Babylon Bee*, and *The Daily Mash*). The user can click on the shield to see an overlay of more detailed information about the reliability of the news domain in question.[2]

Figure 1: This figure displays how users are exposed to NewsGuard source labels in internet users' search engine results pages, social feeds and visited URLs.



Prior research investigates the ability of expert source ratings to affect the believability of claims encoun-

NewsGuard extension, which was freely available in app stores at the time of fielding, NewsGuard did not provide any financial support or assistance in the design of this study.

[2]We show these source reliability symbols in Section G of the Supplementary Materials.

tered online, including on health websites and social media (Kim et al. 2019; Kim and Dennis 2019). Theoretically, such ratings provide credible information to users about the "functional" dimension of a source's reputation, or its objective performance in a well-defined set of criteria as assessed by experts. Though other dimensions of reputation may not be as responsive to these judgments, experimental evidence suggests that such ratings, when shown alongside a mock news article, can influence the perceived truthfulness of the article's claim (Kim et al. 2019; Gallup 2018). NewsGuard provides a particularly comprehensive set of source ratings produced according to transparent criteria. Deploying these source ratings as visible labels across a user's search and social feeds provides an opportunity to test the effectiveness of expert ratings as a general solution to online misinformation.

Other attempts to leverage source-level information have been mixed. Though experimental demonstrations of source label effects on selective exposure are well known (Iyengar and Hahn 2009), studies have failed to convincingly show that such cues affect susceptibility to misinformation (Clayton et al. 2019b; Dias et al. 2020). Part of the problem may be that people lack sufficient knowledge about many sources (especially smaller, more unreliable ones that are rarely consumed) to be able to make useful inferences based solely on a publisher's name or logo. Expert ratings of the kind that NewsGuard provides potentially remedy this shortcoming by supplementing source cues with additional, independently verified information (see Gallup 2019 for survey data from a sample of NewsGuard users).

A large, related literature on source credibility examines the attributes of sources that make them more believable (Hovland et al. 1953; Flanagin and Metzger 2000). Researchers have sought to apply these insights to the problem of online misinformation, though a recent meta-analysis found that source credibility-based interventions were among the weakest of those studied for correcting misinformation (Walter and Murphy 2018). The treatments considered differ in two important respects from the source reliability labels that we study. First, they do not typically involve news publishers; "source credibility" conceptualizes messengers broadly to encompass institutions, highly esteemed individuals, or other potential trustworthy sources of information in society. Second, these studies specifically test the extent to which credibility can boost the efficacy of corrections to individual pieces of misinformation rather than display, as NewsGuard does, expert ratings alongside any article (sans correction).

Existing work suggests relationships between exposure to misinformation and various well-known pathologies. Misperceptions are the most commonly studied phenomenon (Flynn et al. 2017), which can result from direct exposure to online misinformation (e.g., Guess et al. 2020c; Loomba et al. 2021). In this setting, however, participants are not exposed to specific misinformation in a controlled way. More generally, scholars have suggested reactions to online "fake news" — and the epistemic chaos it engenders — in the form of heightened cynicism toward politics overall (Lazer et al. 2018) and lower trust in traditional media (Wasser-

man and Madrid-Morales 2019; Ognyanova et al. 2020). Additionally, studies have posited that exposure to misinformation can increase affective polarization (Lau et al. 2017; Suhay et al. 2018; Tsfati and Nir 2017) since such hyperbolic, misleading content is often engineered to fuel disdain for the partisan outgroup. Given these findings, we examine whether source reliability ratings can counteract these effects. This could occur via two mechanisms. First, by reducing the likelihood that individuals click on misleading or unreliable sources of information, these ratings would lower exposure to misinformation that can promote corrosive attitudes toward politics and society. Second, repeated exposure to labels alongside headlines of varying believability could induce a learning effect. Given prior evidence, it is likely that individuals will either encounter mainly reliable sources or a mix of the two. In the former case, positive ratings could boost news sources' credibility in general, while the latter case creates an opportunity for improved discernment between reliable and unreliable news sources (Kim and Dennis 2019). This also allows for a virtuous cycle in which people are gradually exposed to less inflammatory content about the political outgroup.

Our main hypotheses thus test whether in-feed source reliability labels shift downstream news and information consumption from unreliable sources known for publishing misleading or false content to more reliable sources (H1), increase trust in mainstream media[3] and reliable sources (H2), and mitigate phenomena associated with democratic dysfunction (affective polarization and political cynicism)[4] (H3). We also consider three research questions for which our *a priori* expectations were less clear. First, past research suggests that certain kinds of interventions can reduce people's beliefs in both accurate and inaccurate information (Clayton et al. 2019a; Guess et al. 2020b), so we examine whether respondents encouraged to install the NewsGuard extension were more or less likely to believe popular false and true stories that spread during the treatment period.[5] Second, we explore whether downstream effects are observable on other outcomes such as trust in institutions, belief that "fake news" is a problem in general, and belief that "fake news" is a problem in the mainstream media. Third, we explore whether any of the identified effects are greater among subgroups found in prior research to more frequently engage with online misinformation.[6] Results from all of our pre-registered analyses can be found in the Supplementary Materials, Sections C, D, E, and F, G and H.

Combining panel survey data and individual-level web visit data, we find in pre-registered[7] analyses

[3]We also test if the effect of the treatment on trust in media is larger among individuals who have lower levels of initial trust in media.

[4]We also test if the effect of the treatment on affective polarization is larger among individuals who have higher levels of affective polarization.

[5]We were not able to pre-register this research question because we selected the items as close to fielding as possible. We include the results because they are more directly comparable to studies evaluating the effects of interventions designed specifically to reduce misperceptions.

[6]These groups include those who use social media sites more frequently, have low levels of digital literacy, consume more news, and already visit more online publishers of untrustworthy news.

[7]The pre-registration can be found here: REDACTED FOR BLIND REVIEW

that in-browser contextual source labels: (1) do not measurably shift participants' online consumption from unreliable sources known for publishing misleading or false content to more reliable sources; (2) fail to reduce average belief in widely circulated inaccurate claims; and (3) do not alter trust in the media generally. Our estimates — especially for survey-based outcomes — are well-powered, and we can rule out even very small Intent-to-Treat effects (Cohen's $d < 0.07$). Our null findings on changes in participants' information diet quality are somewhat noisier, though we can still rule out small effects (Cohen's $d < 0.09$) according to standard benchmarks. Our noisier estimates on behavior are themselves informative, since they reflect the well-established reality that people with diets consisting overwhelmingly of untrustworthy news sources are a relatively small subset of the population (Guess et al. 2020a). Interventions designed to improve news quality through dynamic feedback may therefore need to focus their efforts on these individuals and tailor the information they provide accordingly. Consistent with this — and in light of our original null findings — we undertake supplementary analyses (not preregistered) and find that the treatment does appear to improve the average reliability score of the news consumed by participants at the lowest decile of pre-treatment online news diet quality.

Results

To measure the effect of these source labels, we fielded a two-wave online panel survey from May 28 to June 30, 2020 (Wave 1: May 28–June 9, $N = 3,862$; Wave 2: June 19–June 30, $N = 3,337$) that included a randomized incentive to install the NewsGuard web extension at the beginning of the first wave. Enough respondents were recruited that we are confident that we could detect even a small standardized effect size (9% of a standard deviation) among respondents for whom we have behavioral data as well as the larger survey sample. Results from our power analyses can be found in the Supplementary Materials in Section J. Fig. 2 presents an overview of the study design. In addition to studying survey-based outcomes, we analyze linked digital trace data to measure the quality of news consumption of a subset of our participants. We create five distinct measures of news diet quality[8] over three time periods: (i) the period before a respondent was assigned treatment in the Wave 1 survey; (ii) the 3- to 4-week period from treatment assignment (May 28–June 9) to June 30; (iii) the nearly two-week period from July 1 to July 13. Testing the effect of this treatment on news consumption during the third period was not a part of our original set of pre-registered hypotheses, but rather a pre-registered research question. Using the measurement of news consumption in the third period we leverage the exogenous disabling of NewsGuard's free capabilities on July 1[9] to determine

[8] We calculated the average NewsGuard reliability score for websites visited, proportion and counts of unreliable (NewsGuard score < 60) news sites visited, and proportion and counts of reliable news sites visited.

[9] On that day, the NewsGuard extension became a pay service with a monthly subscription fee of $2.99. At that point, those who did not sign up to purchase the extension continued to encounter shield icons next to news stories, but the color no longer

whether the behavioral effects of this intervention decay after its features are no longer available (Gerber et al. 2011), or if the intervention has more durable effects like other novel informational nudges (Coppock et al. 2018).

Figure 2: This figure displays a timeline of our data collection surrounding our two-wave online panel survey from May 28 to June 30, 2020 (Wave 1: May 28–June 9, $N = 3,862$; Wave 2: June 19–June 30, $N = 3,337$).



In this section we primarily report covariate-adjusted estimates of an Intent-to-Treat (ITT) effect measuring differences between the control and treatment groups on outcomes of interest. In the Supplementary Materials (Section C) we report covariate-adjusted estimates of Complier Average Causal Effects (CACE), the effect among those who installed the browser extension as a result of the randomized treatment. To verify treatment compliance, we developed an automated script linked in the survey that measured whether participants in the treatment and control groups had installed and activated the NewsGuard extension on their web browsers twice: directly after the treatment was assigned in Wave 1 and in the last week of the treatment period. 95% of respondents in the treatment group passed the first compliance check and 80% passed both the first and second compliance check. For most demographic characteristics we find no statistically significant evidence that respondents who comply are very much different than those who did not comply; moreover, for demographic characteristics where we find a statistically significant difference, the

reflected credibility and contextual information was no longer accessible. Given the disabling of NewsGuard's free capabilities on July 1, respondents were effectively treated for 3 to 4 weeks. We pre-registered that this disabling of NewsGuard was a part of our research design. We stated in our pre-registration that if we were able to collect digital trace data after this date, we would test whether the NewsGuard treatment caused subjects to be more likely to visit sources deemed reliable by NewsGuard or less likely to visit sources deemed unreliable by NewsGuard in the period after the treatment ended.

magnitudes of these differences are very small.[10]

Since a lack of statistically significant coefficients does not necessarily imply effects of a negligible magnitude, we use equivalence testing to rule out any meaningful effects in all of the following models (Rainey 2014; Lakens 2017; Hartman and Hidalgo 2018). Conservatively, negligible effects are defined as those smaller than 20% of a standard deviation (Cohen 1969) of the population on a pre-treatment measure of a variable, although others have advocated for higher thresholds (Imbens and Rubin 2015; Hartman and Hidalgo 2018). We thus calculate standardized effects for each estimate shown in Fig. 4 and 5. The magnitudes of these standardized effects never rise above 10% of a standard deviation, thus remaining far below the most conservative established threshold, rejecting the hypothesis of even a small effect on the outcome variable. In addition to these standardized effect sizes, we also estimate minimum detectable effects for covariate-adjusted ITT models reported in the main text in Section J in the Supplementary Materials. Assuming power of 0.80 and that statistically significant effects must cross the p-value threshold of 0.05, the models can at a minimum detect effects larger than 6.5% of a standard deviation for all of the attitudinal measures and any effect larger than 8.9% for all of the behavioral measures. Our design is thus well-powered to detect small effects of the intervention (though this is generally not the case for interactions).

In our sample of respondents for whom we collect behavioral news consumption data ($N = 946$), most did not visit an unreliable news site during the two- to three-week pre-treatment period (over 65%) and just under 12% of our sample's news diet consisted of at least 5% of visits to news sites deemed unreliable by NewsGuard. Indeed, only 1.5% of respondents' news diets had an average NewsGuard reliability score below 60 (the threshold for reliability). This distribution appears consistent across the treatment and control groups. Fig. 3a through 3c present the distribution of average online reliability scores of respondents in both the control and treatment groups over the three time periods of interest.[11] The long tail of low-quality online news consumption is in line with what work has reported (Guess et al. 2020a), though the relatively rare prevalence of visits to unreliable sites among our respondents creates a challenge in terms of statistical power when estimating treatment effects on the behavioral measures focused on the consumption of unreliable news (the proportion of unreliable news and the count of unreliable news) among the full population. For this reason, we also test the effect of the treatment on the subset of respondents who consume the most low-quality news. Given that the average NewsGuard reliability score of respondents' news diets was 87.6 out of 100 and 67.4% of news viewed was considered reliable (scores of 60 or above), there is sufficient variation for detecting heterogeneous effects on overall news diet quality by quantiles of these pre-treatment scores.

[10] More details on how compliance was estimated, compliance rates, and how compliers differed from non-compliers can be found in the Materials and Methods section. About 1% of those in the control group already had the NewsGuard extension installed and activated.

[11] In Section N of the Supplementary Materials we present the distributions of the other four behavioral measures in each time period.

Figure 3: This figure presents the distribution of the average reliability scores of online news consumption among respondents in the treatment and control groups with vertical dashed lines indicating the mean reliability score in each group. Panel A presents these distributions during the pre-treatment period. Panel B presents these distributions during the treatment period. Panel C presents these distributions during the post-treatment period.

(a) Pre-Treatment Period



(b) Treatment Period



(c) Post-Treatment Period



Contrary to Hypothesis 1, we do not find that randomized exposure to in-browser source reliability information shifts online consumption of news away from unreliable publishers. We present the treatment effect estimates for each pre-registered behavioral outcome in Fig. 4. As the figure indicates, we do not find statistically significant decreases in the proportion of news consumed from unreliable sources or in the count of unreliable online news consumed, either during the period when NewsGuard was installed by those in the treatment group or in the two weeks after NewsGuard became a pay service. We also do not find that the intervention measurably shifts individuals toward reliable news: We do not observe statistically significant increases in the proportion of news consumed from reliable sources, in the count of visits to these sources, or in the average reliability score of online news consumed in either time period due to the treatment. In addition to an absence of statistically significant effects, the estimated magnitudes are extremely small: all of the reported effect sizes constitute less than a 0.08 change in the standard deviation of the pre-treatment measure of that variable.

Given these results we conducted a series of non-preregistered supplementary analyses to better understand the seemingly negligible impact of the news quality labels on news consumption. To determine if the treatment affects the time spent on unreliable or reliable news websites, we weight each variable by duration, but this does not measurably change the results (details can be found in Section C of the Supplementary Materials). We also measured these variables strictly as referrals from social media sites and search engines and find no statistically significant treatment effects (details can be found in Section C of the Supplementary Materials). Finally, we divide the sample according to pre-treatment deciles of respondents' average news reliability scores.[12] Interestingly, we find relatively strong and statistically significant treatment effects among those in the lowest decile of news diet reliability (Fig. 5): Relative to the average pre-treatment value, we estimate a 5.4% increase in the treatment period and a 8.6% increase beginning July 1 in the average reliability score of news consumed (full results for each behavioral measure across each decile can be found in Section K of the Supplementary Materials). The effect appears to be weaker when measured between treatment assignment and July 1 than in the two weeks after the extension's functionality ended, which is consistent with an over-time learning effect as respondents received more feedback about the reliability of online sources in their search results and social feeds. Though suggestive (and likely underpowered), these subgroup effects are consistent with the intervention being mainly effective among those who consume the greatest amount of content from relatively unreliable sources, which can be seen in the tails of the bottom

[12] We do not report as a primary specification multiplicative interaction models. As Hainmueller et al. (2019) explain, models of this kind assume a constant change across values of the moderator and require sufficient common support. Given the discussion of the skew in NewsGuard scores, it is unlikely that our data provide common support between the treatment and moderator. Additionally, as we show below, it is unlikely that any effect heterogeneity is linear. For these reasons, the visual display of our exploratory results is preferable to models that impose additional, implausible assumptions. We note that these points also apply to all of our pre-registered moderation analyses given the above-noted skew.

two panels in Fig. 3. We also tested whether treatment effects were detectable among respondents that are more likely to view unreliable online news (older respondents, those with lower levels of digital literacy, and those that self-identify as Republican), but do not report any statistically significant effects on the quality of online news consumption among these groups.[13]

Figure 4: This figure presents estimates of the effect of the intervention (ITT, with 95% confidence intervals) on our pre-registered online behavioral measures in the two periods after treatment assignment: before July 1 when the NewsGuard extension was freely available and the two-week period between July 1–13 when the NewsGuard extension was disabled. The effect is reported in standard deviations of that measure (pre-treatment).



[13]Results of these exploratory analyses can be found in Section M of the Supplementary Materials.

Figure 5: This figure presents estimates of the effect of the intervention on the average NewsGuard reliability score of respondents' news diets (with 95% confidence intervals). This is estimated for subsets of the sample with pre-treatment reliability scores below successive decile cutpoints.



The next hypothesis predicted that source reliability feedback would increase trust in the media and reliable sources (H2). We find that the treatment does not increase trust in media or in specific reliable news sources. Our estimates of the treatment effect on trust in media and in selected specific sources deemed reliable by NewsGuard are not statistically distinguishable from zero, and the reported effect sizes are less than a 0.05 change in the standard deviation of the pre-treatment measure of that variable. A figure depicting the effect of the intervention on our pre-registered attitudinal measures can be found in Section K of the Supplementary Materials.

We also find no support for our final hypothesis, which predicted that exposure to the treatment could help to alleviate pathologies such as affective polarization[14] and political cynicism associated with consuming, believing, and sharing news from unreliable sources (H3), which in retrospect is perhaps not surprising because we did not find an effect for the treatment on consuming of believing news from unreliable sources.

[14]We also do not find that any effect of the treatment is concentrated among those with higher levels of affective polarization. These results can be found in Sections E and F in the Supplementary Materials.

RQ1 asked whether source reliability information affects belief in misinformation as well as accurate claims. To answer this question, all respondents were asked to judge the veracity of five widely circulated statements about the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement and five similarly well-circulated statements about Covid-19 using a four-point scale in Wave 2. Of the five statements about each topic, three were false and two were true. By taking the mean of the perceived veracity measure for the three false statements about each topic we created a measure of belief in misinformation in the BLM movement and Covid-19, and we likewise created a measure of belief in true information using the other two items. The intervention *had no effect on* belief in misinformation about the Black Lives Matter movement and Covid-19, and it did not measurably affect belief in the true statements.[15]

Our second research question asked whether exposure to the intervention leads to effects on other outcomes such as trust in institutions, belief that fake news is a problem in general, and belief that fake news is a problem in the mainstream media. We do not find that the intervention measurably affected these outcomes.[16] Finally, RQ3 asked if any effects are moderated by specific characteristics (proportion of news consumed that is unreliable, partisanship of news diet, online news consumption, social media use, digital literacy, and belief in scientific misinformation), but we find no other consistent evidence of effect heterogeneity.

Discussion

Despite the promise of browser-based tools designed to reduce users' reliance on misinformation,[17] evidence from a pre-registered randomized field experiment among a large representative sample of Americans reveals that the particular intervention studied here — providing dynamic, in-feed source reliability labels — does not measurably improve news diet quality or reduce misperceptions on average among the general population. Our estimates, based on both survey and behavioral data collected over an extended period, are precise and rule out even modest effect sizes by conventional standards.

Though we are able to measure pre- and post-treatment news consumption "in the wild" as well as treatment compliance at the point of installation, we do not capture the contents of participants' browser experience — what they *see* but don't click on. This means that we did not directly observe how often users encountered NewsGuard's labels in the course of browsing their feeds and perusing search results pages during the study period. We can estimate how often they were exposed to these labels by counting the number of visits to online news sites rated by NewsGuard (which trigger a source quality label in the browser

[15] Reported effect sizes are all below a 0.03 change in the standard deviation.

[16] Reported effect sizes are all below a 0.03 change in the standard deviation.

[17] Survey data on users' experience with the tool indicates generally positive assessments (Gallup 2019); see also `https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/04/27/america-social-media-problem-newsguard-484757`.

bar when the extension is installed), Google search results pages, and time spent on Facebook or Twitter during the pre-treatment period; we present distributions of these measures in the Supplementary Materials in Section J. We are most interested in respondents' time spent on search engine results pages (SERPs) and social media feeds because users scrolling through these pages are likelier to be exposed to the credibility ratings for multiple news sites as opposed to one at a time. This should theoretically translate to greater potential for the labels' effectiveness than discrete visits to online news sites rated by NewsGuard, though we find that the majority of our respondents rarely visit Google SERPs for long periods of time. Specifically, the median time spent on Google SERPs per day in the pre-treatment period is only a few seconds, and the mean is 1.6 minutes. This is consistent with evidence that users typically gravitate toward top-ranked search results (Guan and Cutrell 2007).The relative rarity of exposure to credibility ratings in these contexts may partly explain the negligible effect of this intervention on the quality of online news consumption and downstream attitudes.

Our results speak to a large body of work on heuristics, cognitive processing, and reputation theory (e.g., Chaiken 1987; Flanagin and Metzger 2000; Kim et al. 2019). The NewsGuard shield icons provide expertise cues, which have been shown since the work of Hovland to be associated with increased source credibility (Hovland et al. 1953). However, in a more partisan age in which attitudes toward news sources are strongly correlated with partisanship (Jurkowitz et al. 2020), relatively subtle contextual information may not be a sufficiently powerful prod to shift perceptions of source credibility. Our findings also relate to an emerging body of research on accuracy motives among social media users and attempts to encourage discernment in news sharing behavior via "accuracy nudges" (Pennycook et al. 2021). Though real-world experimentation points to the efficacy of such interventions, our null findings raise the possibility that accuracy mechanisms may operate differently for publicly observable sharing behavior than for private consumption. For example, sharing false information may come with a perceived reputational cost that is not associated with low-quality news consumption (Altay et al. 2019).

Although we do not uncover statistically significant average treatment effects, we present suggestive evidence of a substantively meaningful boost in news quality among the heaviest consumers of misinformation in our sample (who comprise a small proportion of respondents, approximately 10%, consistent with prior research on fake news exposure). In both the treatment period (before July 1) and in the post-treatment period (beginning July 1) we observed the quality of news diets among the lowest 10% of our sample increase by 5.4% and 8.6% from their pre-treatment levels, respectively. For the period beginning July 1, we even observe a statistically significant increase in news reliability among those in the bottom 20% of pre-treatment news consumption quality.

NewsGuard is not the only web extension that offers expert ratings, but it is likely the most comprehensive

and transparent. Other web extensions, such as NoBias and Media Bias/Factcheck, do provide similar levels of coverage online but report ideological bias rather than reliability. Other extensions such as Newstrition and The Factual provide article and source-level ratings, but these only appear in social media feeds and not in search engine results. Given these considerations, it seems likely that other extensions would not produce larger treatment effects than those we estimate for NewsGuard.

Our findings illustrate the challenge of studying interventions arguably aimed at a specific (and often difficult-to-sample) population, namely the heaviest consumers of misinformation. Though we chose to optimize our sampling for maximal treatment compliance, this came with a tradeoff in the form of lower prevalence of the target behavior. Future research should consider the costs and benefits of other strategies, such as oversampling from the desired population to increase statistical precision. Our results are best interpreted as population-level estimates of the treatment effect, which remains a parameter of great interest to policymakers, platforms, and designers of digital tools alike.

Materials and Methods

NewsGuard Extension and Ratings

To produce credibility ratings, NewsGuard employs a team of trained journalists and editors to review and rate news and information websites based on nine journalistic criteria. The criteria assess basic practices of reliability and transparency. Based on a site's performance on these nine criteria, it is assigned a reliability rating from 0–100.[18] Online domains with score of 60 or higher are considered reliable (green shield), while scores below 60 are considered unreliable.[19] A histogram of NewsGuard scores for the majority of online news domains can be found in Section B of the Supplementary Materials.[20] NewsGuard can be installed on all major web browsers (Safari, Microsoft Edge, Mozilla Firefox, Internet Explorer, and Google Chrome) as well as Android and iOS mobile phones. Normally, the NewsGuard extension costs $2.99 per month, but it is available for free (and bundled) with Microsoft Edge as well as to over 200 million potential users worldwide through assorted partnerships.[21]

[18] The criteria are: "Does not repeatedly publish false content", "Gathers and presents information responsibly", "Regularly corrects or clarifies errors", "Handles the difference between news and opinion responsibly", "Avoids deceptive headlines", "Website discloses ownership and financing", "Clearly labels advertising", "Reveals who's in charge, including any possible conflicts of interest", and "The site provides names of content creators, along with either contact or biographical information".

[19] Over 41% of the more than 5,000 news domains rated received a red, suspect rating. Reassuringly, the NewsGuard list contains most of the "fake news" publishers identified by Allcott et al. (2019); 88% of the online news domains in the Allcott et al. (2019) list are rated as unreliable by NewsGuard. In addition, 99% of mainstream online news domains identified by Microsoft Project Ratio are rated as reliable by NewsGuard.

[20] Over the course of 2020, NewsGuard rated 2,144 additional news domains and partnered with the World Health Organization to report misinformation and flag 371 websites that spread misinformation about Covid-19 in the first months of the pandemic.

[21] Currently, NewsGuard is offered for free to 30 million BT internet and mobile customers, students through TurnItIn, and patrons at over 750 libraries (including the Chicago Public Library).

Data, Sample and Measures

We conducted a two-wave online panel survey of U.S. adults through the survey company YouGov in the summer of 2020 that included an encouragement to install NewsGuard in the first wave. Respondents were selected by YouGov's matching and weighting algorithm to approximate the demographic and political attributes of the U.S. population (32% college graduates, 45% male, median age 50 years old; 46% identify as Democrats and 36% as Republicans). We also oversampled members of the YouGov Pulse panel, who voluntarily provide behavioral data on their online information consumption ($N = 946$) (see Section B in the Supplementary Materials for demographic details). Pulse panelists confidentially share visit-level data on domains and URLs of web activity, including estimated duration and time stamps, on registered desktop/laptop and mobile devices. Data from Pulse panelists in our sample comprise $N = 11,903,134$ observations collected from laptop and desktop computers via the Reality Mine app. In the main text we present measures using desktop data only, given that respondents could only install NewsGuard on their desktops at the time the study ran.[22] Secure transactions and passwords are not collected or shared with researchers, and YouGov performs a scrub of personally identifying information before delivering the data. For thorough validation of Pulse data, see Guess et al. (2020a); Guess (2020).

The main outcome of interest is news consumed by our study participants from publishers of low-quality news sources. We are also interested in the effect of this intervention on the dependent variables specified in our other hypotheses and research questions, including the perceived accuracy of true and false news stories, trust in media, and other possible downstream effects. We are also interested if effects on these variables are higher within certain subgroups, such as those those who use social media more or that have lower levels of digital literacy. Details on all of these variables are available in Section A of the Supplementary Materials.

Treatment and Compliance

At the beginning of the Wave 1 survey, respondents were asked if they would be willing to install an extension to their web browser, which was intended to minimize differences between the treatment and control group and in compliance. We then randomly assigned respondents in Wave 1 to be encouraged to install the NewsGuard web extension. We do not find that those in the treatment and control groups were statistically different across income, race, partisanship, education, and gender (sample demographic details are presented in Section B of the Supplementary Materials). Those in the treatment group were slightly younger (by 2 years) and had slightly higher levels of digital literacy than the control group, but the magnitudes of these differences are small. We also found recontact rates in the treatment group and the control group to be

[22] In Section O of the Supplementary Materials we replicate Fig. 4 in the main text but use only mobile data that we collected.

similar (14.1% in the control group compared to 13.2% in the treatment group).[23] Based on Wave 2 survey data, 94% of participants in the treatment group who installed NewsGuard felt neutral or positive toward the extension, and 41% liked the extension "a little" or "a lot."

We define "compliance" as successfully installing and activating the NewsGuard extension (as a result of the encouragement), which we validate via a script linked at the beginning of the Wave 1 survey and during the last week of the treatment period.[24] This gives us two separate compliance measures that we can use for over 92% of our respondents.[25] Notably, we find little difference in the characteristics of respondents who would successfully take the treatment if encouraged ("compliers")[26] and those who would not take the treatment if encouraged ("never-takers"). We find no statistically significant evidence that respondents who comply are very much different than those who did not comply along the dimensions of age, partisanship, gender, or race. Compliers are more likely to hold a postsecondary degree, report a higher income level, and score higher on our digital literacy scale than never-takers, but the magnitudes of these differences are small.[27] Among the respondents for whom we have web data, compliers score higher on our digital literacy scale and consumed a higher proportion of unreliable news domains than never-takers in the pre-treatment period, but again, the magnitudes of these differences are small.

Analysis

Our pre-registered primary analyses are an Intent-to-Treat (ITT) model and two Complier Average Causal Effect (CACE) models using two different compliance measures, one that measures compliance solely at the beginning of the treatment period and another which measures compliance both at the beginning and end of the treatment period. We report both unadjusted (differences in means) and covariate-adjusted estimates of treatment effects for each dependent variable of interest.[28] For covariate-adjusted models, we selected covariates for inclusion using lasso regressions run separately for each dependent variable. The list of pre-treatment variables for possible inclusion as covariates can be found in Section A of the Supplementary

[23] We do not find significant differences in demographic characteristics between those in the control and treatment groups who did not complete Wave 2. We also do not find that treatment compliance rates differ between those who completed Wave 2 and those who did not (53% of respondents in the treatment group who attrited installed the NewsGuard extension, while 57% of respondents in the treatment group who did not attrite installed the extension). Details are presented in Section B of the Supplementary Materials.

[24] Respondents click the verification link in both compliance checks and they are redirected to a separate page in which we can verify whether the NewsGuard extension has been installed and is active. We record their unique ID and the result of the compliance check, so we can match it to their survey responses. We did not ask early respondents of our Wave 2 survey to complete the compliance check during the survey. Rather, we waited until the last week of the treatment period and sent them an e-mail asking them to click on the verification link. Respondents who filled out the Wave 2 survey in the last week of the treatment period were asked to click on the verification link at the end of their Wave 2 survey.

[25] This compliance check failed about 4% of the time due to random browser or survey issues that do not appear biased in any identifiable direction. Given this, we only collected first and second compliance check data for 92% of our respondents.

[26] In this analysis we define compliance using our second, stronger measure that uses the compliance checks during Wave 1 and during the last week of the treatment period.

[27] Details comparing these two groups can be found in Section B of the Supplementary Materials.

[28] We use robust standard errors (HC2) in all analyses and report p-values from two-tailed t-tests.

Materials.

One concern with using an ITT model is that it will understate the true effect of an intervention when some respondents do not comply with the encouragement, but we report relatively high levels of compliance (discussed at length in the previous section). Given high levels of compliance we report the covariate-adjusted Intent-To-Treat effect in the main text of the paper and the Complier Average Causal Effect (CACE) using both measures of compliance in the Supplementary Materials.

References

Allcott, H., Gentzkow, M., and Yu, C. (2019). Trends in the diffusion of misinformation on social media. *Research & Politics*, 6(2).

Altay, S., Hacquin, A.-S., and Mercier, H. (2019). Why do so few people share fake news? it hurts their reputation. *new media & society*.

Anspach, N. M., Jennings, J. T., and Arceneaux, K. (2019). A little bit of knowledge: Facebook's news feed and self-perceptions of knowledge. *Research & Politics*, 6(1).

Badrinathan, S. (2020). Educative interventions to combat misinformation: Evidence from a field experiment in india. *American Political Science Review*, pages 1–17.

Brennen, J. S., Simon, F., Howard, P. N., and Nielsen, R. K. (2020). Types, sources, and claims of covid-19 misinformation.

Chaiken, S. (1987). The heuristic model of persuasion. In *Social influence: the ontario symposium*, volume 5, pages 3–39.

Clayton, K., Blair, S., Busam, J. A., Forstner, S., Glance, J., Green, G., Kawata, A., Kovvuri, A., Martin, J., Morgan, E., et al. (2019a). Real solutions for fake news? measuring the effectiveness of general warnings and fact-check tags in reducing belief in false stories on social media. *Political Behavior*, pages 1–23.

Clayton, K., Davis, J., Hinckley, K., and Horiuchi, Y. (2019b). Partisan motivated reasoning and misinformation in the media: Is news from ideologically uncongenial sources more suspicious? *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, 20(3):129–142.

Cohen, J. (1969). *Statistical power analysis for the behavioral sciences*. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Coppock, A., Ekins, E., Kirby, D., et al. (2018). The long-lasting effects of newspaper op-eds on public opinion. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 13(1):59–87.

Dias, N., Pennycook, G., and Rand, D. G. (2020). Emphasizing publishers does not effectively reduce susceptibility to misinformation on social media. *Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review*, 1(1).

Ecker, U. K., Lewandowsky, S., and Tang, D. T. (2010). Explicit warnings reduce but do not eliminate the continued influence of misinformation. *Memory & cognition*, 38(8):1087–1100.

Flanagin, A. J. and Metzger, M. J. (2000). Perceptions of internet information credibility. *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly*, 77(3):515–540.

Flynn, D., Nyhan, B., and Reifler, J. (2017). The nature and origins of misperceptions: Understanding false and unsupported beliefs about politics. *Political Psychology*, 38:127–150.

Gallup (2018). Assessing the effect of news source ratings on news content.

Gallup (2019). Newsguard's online source rating tool: User experience.

Gerber, A. S., Gimpel, J. G., Green, D. P., and Shaw, D. R. (2011). How large and long-lasting are the persuasive effects of televised campaign ads? results from a randomized field experiment. *American Political Science Review*, pages 135–150.

Gigerenzer, G. and Selten, R. (2002). *Bounded rationality: The adaptive toolbox*. MIT press.

Grinberg, N., Joseph, K., Friedland, L., Swire-Thompson, B., and Lazer, D. (2019). Fake news on twitter during the 2016 us presidential election. *Science*, 363(6425):374–378.

Guan, Z. and Cutrell, E. (2007). An eye tracking study of the effect of target rank on web search. In *Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference on Human factors in computing systems*, pages 417–420.

Guess, A., Nagler, J., and Tucker, J. (2019). Less than you think: Prevalence and predictors of fake news dissemination on Facebook. *Science Advances*, 5(1).

Guess, A., Nyhan, B., and Reifler, J. (2020a). Exposure to untrustworthy websites in the 2016 us election. *Nature Human Behaviour*, 4(5):472–480.

Guess, A. M. (2020). (Almost) Everything in Moderation: New Evidence on Americans' Online Media Diets. *American Journal of Political Science*.

Guess, A. M., Barberá, P., Munzert, S., and Yang, J. (2021). The consequences of online partisan media. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 118(14).

Guess, A. M., Lerner, M., Lyons, B., Montgomery, J. M., Nyhan, B., Reifler, J., and Sircar, N. (2020b). A digital media literacy intervention increases discernment between mainstream and false news in the united states and india. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 117(27):15536–15545.

Guess, A. M., Lockett, D., Lyons, B., Montgomery, J. M., Nyhan, B., and Reifler, J. (2020c). "fake news" may have limited effects beyond increasing beliefs in false claims. *Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review*, 1(1).

Hainmueller, J., Mummolo, J., and Xu, Y. (2019). How much should we trust estimates from multiplicative interaction models? simple tools to improve empirical practice. *Political Analysis*, 27(2):163–192.

Hartman, E. and Hidalgo, F. D. (2018). An equivalence approach to balance and placebo tests. *American Journal of Political Science*, 62(4):1000–1013.

Hovland, C. I., Janis, I. L., and Kelley, H. H. (1953). Communication and persuasion.

Imbens, G. W. and Rubin, D. B. (2015). *Causal inference in statistics, social, and biomedical sciences.* Cambridge University Press.

Iyengar, S. and Hahn, K. S. (2009). Red media, blue media: Evidence of ideological selectivity in media use. *Journal of communication*, 59(1):19–39.

Jurkowitz, M., Mitchell, A., Shearer, E., and Walker, M. (2020). U.s. media polarization and the 2020 election: A nation divided. Pew Research Center, January 24, 2020. Downloaded June 9, 2020 from `https://www.journalism.org/2020/01/24/u-s-media-polarization-and-the-2020-election-a-nation-divided/`.

Kim, A. and Dennis, A. R. (2019). Says who? the effects of presentation format and source rating on fake news in social media. *Mis Quarterly*, 43(3).

Kim, A., Moravec, P. L., and Dennis, A. R. (2019). Combating fake news on social media with source ratings: The effects of user and expert reputation ratings. *Journal of Management Information Systems*, 36(3):931–968.

Lakens, D. (2017). Equivalence tests: A practical primer for t tests, correlations, and meta-analyses. *Social psychological and personality science*, 8(4):355–362.

Lau, R. R., Andersen, D. J., Ditonto, T. M., Kleinberg, M. S., and Redlawsk, D. P. (2017). Effect of media environment diversity and advertising tone on information search, selective exposure, and affective polarization. *Political Behavior*, 39(1):231–255.

Lazer, D. M. J., Baum, M. A., Benkler, Y., Berinsky, A. J., Greenhill, K. M., Menczer, F., Metzger, M. J., Nyhan, B., Pennycook, G., Rothschild, D., Schudson, M., Sloman, S. A., Sunstein, C. R., Thorson, E. A., Watts, D. J., and Zittrain, J. L. (2018). The science of fake news. *Science*, 359(6380):1094–1096.

Loomba, S., de Figueiredo, A., Piatek, S. J., de Graaf, K., and Larson, H. J. (2021). Measuring the impact of covid-19 vaccine misinformation on vaccination intent in the uk and usa. *Nature human behaviour*, 5(3):337–348.

Lorenz-Spreen, P., Lewandowsky, S., Sunstein, C. R., and Hertwig, R. (2020). How behavioural sciences can promote truth, autonomy and democratic discourse online. *Nature Human Behaviour*, 0:1–8.

Messing, S. and Westwood, S. J. (2014). Selective exposure in the age of social media: Endorsements trump partisan source affiliation when selecting news online. *Communication research*, 41(8):1042–1063.

Munzert, S., Barberá, P., Guess, A., and Yang, J. (2021a). Do online voter guides empower citizens? evidence from a field experiment with digital trace data. *Public Opinion Quarterly*.

Munzert, S., Selb, P., Gohdes, A., Stoetzer, L. F., and Lowe, W. (2021b). Tracking and promoting the usage of a covid-19 contact tracing app. *Nature Human Behaviour*, pages 1–9.

Nyhan, B., Reifler, J., and Ubel, P. A. (2013). The hazards of correcting myths about health care reform. *Medical care*, pages 127–132.

Ognyanova, K., Lazer, D., Robertson, R. E., and Wilson, C. (2020). Misinformation in action: Fake news exposure is linked to lower trust in media, higher trust in government when your side is in power. *Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review*.

Osmundsen, M., Bor, A., Vahlstrup, P. B., Bechmann, A., and Petersen, M. B. (Forthcoming). Partisan polarization is the primary psychological motivation behind 'fake news' sharing on twitter. *American Political Science Review*.

Pennycook, G., Bear, A., Collins, E. T., and Rand, D. G. (2020). The implied truth effect: Attaching warnings to a subset of fake news headlines increases perceived accuracy of headlines without warnings. *Management Science*, 66(11):4944–4957.

Pennycook, G., Epstein, Z., Mosleh, M., Arechar, A. A., Eckles, D., and Rand, D. G. (2021). Shifting attention to accuracy can reduce misinformation online. *Nature*.

Pennycook, G. and Rand, D. G. (2019). Fighting misinformation on social media using crowdsourced judgments of news source quality. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 116(7):2521–2526.

Pennycook, G. and Rand, D. G. (2021). Examining false beliefs about voter fraud in the wake of the 2020 presidential election. *PsyArXiv Preprints*.

Rainey, C. (2014). Arguing for a negligible effect. *American Journal of Political Science*, 58(4):1083–1091.

Suhay, E., Bello-Pardo, E., and Maurer, B. (2018). The polarizing effects of online partisan criticism: Evidence from two experiments. *The International Journal of Press/Politics*, 23(1):95–115.

Tsfati, Y. and Nir, L. (2017). Frames and reasoning: Two pathways from selective exposure to affective polarization. *International Journal of Communication*, 11:22.

Vosoughi, S., Roy, D., and Aral, S. (2018). The spread of true and false news online. *Science*, 359(6380):1146–1151.

Walter, N. and Murphy, S. T. (2018). How to unring the bell: A meta-analytic approach to correction of misinformation. *Communication Monographs*, 85(3):423–441.

Wasserman, H. and Madrid-Morales, D. (2019). An exploratory study of "fake news" and media trust in kenya, nigeria and south africa. *African Journalism Studies*, 40(1):107–123.

Supplementary Methods and Materials: News credibility labels have limited but uneven effects on news diet quality and fail to reduce misperceptions

Contents

A Study design

A.1 Dependent Variables

(1) Belief in misinformation and true information: We test whether those in the treatment group are less likely to believe three popular false statements about the Black Lives Matter movement and three popular false statements about Covid-19. We also test if the respondents were more likely to believe two popular true statements the Black Lives Matter movement and true popular statements about Covid-19. To construct this measure, we asked respondents to evaluate the accuracy of a number of headlines on the following 4-point scale:

Possible answers: (A) Not at all accurate (1) (B) Not very accurate (2) (C) Somewhat accurate (3) (D) Very accurate (4) (E) Don't know (NA)

We used two sets of items. One set (Covid-19 misinformation/information) consisted of older, popular claims about Covid-19 circulated before (within 3 months of the beginning of the treatment period) and during the treatment period. The misinformation about Covid-19 was collected from NewsGuard's own newsletter, which documented these false claims as among the most popular at the time. The accurate information was chosen by the researchers from widely shared facts about Covid-19.

The second set consisted of popular claims about the Black Lives Matter movement that started to be spread during the treatment period. The misinformation about the Black Lives Matter was selected by the researchers looking through popular claims about Black Lives Matter fact-checked by one of the following fact-checking organizations: Snopes, Politifact, Reuters, FactCheck.org, and the Associated Press. True statements were chosen by the researchers from popular news during that period.

It is possible that participants were more likely exposed to the Black Lives Matter information/misinformation relative to the Covid-19 information/misinformation, but we have no reason to believe that the claims about Covid-19 weren't circulating during the treatment period.

All of the pieces of misinformation were rated as false by at least one third-party fact-checking organization. The order of the headlines was randomized within wave for each respondent. All of the headlines are listed below:

(1.1) Information about the Black Lives Matter movement (True and False news)

We asked our respondents in the wave 2 survey: Below are statements people have been making about the Black Lives Matter movement and related protests. Please indicate whether you believe the following statements are accurate or not.

(1) Many of these protesters were paid to attend the protest. (False)
A number of fact-checks debunked this popular false claim (click on the hyperlinks to be directed to the URL):
Snopes ; Politifact ; Reuters

(2) The 75-year old man shown on video being pushed to the ground by police in Buffalo, New York was a member of Antifa. (False)
A number of fact-checks debunked this popular false claim (click on the hyperlinks to be directed to the URL):
Politifact ; Factcheck ; AP News

(3) No active police officer deaths have been connected to violence during protests. (True)
The true information can be found here (click on the hyperlinks to be directed to the URL):
Politifact

(4) Donald Trump mocked George Floyd by saying "I can't breathe" at a recent rally. (False)
A number of fact-checks debunked this popular false claim (click on the hyperlinks to be directed to the URL):
Politifact ; Reuters

(5) In response to the Black Lives Matter movement, NASCAR has banned Confederate flags at all races. (True)
The true information can be found here (click on the hyperlinks to be directed to the URL):
CNN ; NPR

(1.2) Information about Covid-19 (True and False news)

Below are statements people have been making about Covid-19 (the novel coronavirus). Please indicate whether you believe the following statements are accurate or not.

(1) Covid-19 is being spread by 5G cell phone technology. (False)
A number of fact-checks debunked this popular false claim (click on the hyperlinks to be directed to the URL):
Reuters ; Fullfact ; BBC

(2) The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is planning to implement a mandatory Covid-19 vaccine program that utilizes microchips under a patient's skin. (False) A number of fact-checks debunked this popular false claim (click on the hyperlinks to be directed to the URL):
Factcheck ; Factcheck ; Nature

(3) A new loss of taste or smell is a symptom of Covid-19. (True)
The true information can be found here (click on the hyperlinks to be directed to the URL):
Mayo Clinic ; Healthline

(4) The Chinese government created Covid-19 as a bioweapon. (False)
A number of fact-checks debunked this popular false claim (click on the hyperlinks to be directed to the URL):
Factcheck ; Buzzfeed News

(5) Covid-19 can be spread by people who do not show symptoms. (True)
The true information can be found here (click on the hyperlinks to be directed to the URL):
Nebraskamed ; CDC

(2) Trust in media:

Media Trust Index (Wave 1: $Media\_Trust\_Index_i$ **; Wave 2:** $Media\_Trust\_Index\_2_i$**)**: Measures the respondent's trust in media using the summed value assigned to the respondent's answer to the next three questions. To create an index for media trust we sum the values assigned to each respondent's answer for each question. The sum is assigned to the following variables: $Media\_Trust\_Index_i$ (wave 1) and $Media\_Trust\_Index\_2_i$ (wave 2):

Some people think that by criticizing leaders, news organizations keep political leaders from doing their job. Others think that such criticism is worth it because it keeps political leaders from doing things that should not be done. Which position is closer to your opinion?

(A) Stops political leaders from doing their job (0) (B) Keep political leaders from doing things that shouldn't be done (1)

In presenting the news dealing with political and social issues, do you think that news organizations deal fairly with all sides, or do they tend to favor one side?

(A) Deal fairly with all sides (1) (B) Tend to favor one side (0)

Based on what you know, how often do you believe the nation's major news organizations fabricate news stories?

(A) All the time (0)
(B) Most of the time (0.25)
(C) About half the time (0.5)
(D) Once in a while (0.75)
(E) Never (1)

The first question is pulled from the Pew American Trends Panel survey (Pew, 2017). The second two questions are taken from Guess, Nyhan and Reifler (2019).

(3) Trust in specific mainstream online news producers

This question measures the level of trust in the following media sources. The value assigned to each respondent is in parentheses next to the answer. Higher values denotes higher levels of trust.

How much, if at all, do you trust the information you get from:
(7) Fox News
(8) CNN
(9) MSNBC
(10) CBS
(11) ABC
(12) NBC

Possible Answers:
(A) A lot (4)
(B) Some (3)
(C) Not too much (2)
(D) Not at all (1)

(4) Affective polarization

Measures affective polarization by taking the absolute value of the difference between the feeling thermometers of each political party taken during each wave. Equation: $dem\_feeling\_thermometer_i$ - $rep\_feeling\_thermometer_i$. Below is the question asked to create this measure.

Feeling Towards Democratic and Republican Party (Wave 1: $dem\_feeling\_thermometer_i$**,** $rep\_feeling\_thermometer$
Wave 2: $dem\_feeling\_thermometer\_2_i$**,** $rep\_feeling\_thermometer\_2_i$**)**: Measure the respondent's the positive feeling towards each party on a thermometer scale of 0 (negative) to 100 (positive). This is one measure of affective polarization. The value of the thermometer is assigned to each respective variable.

(1) How would you rate the Democratic Party?

(2) How would you rate the Republican Party?

This method is the same method used to calculate affective polarization in the ANES survey.

(5) Political cynicism

Measures the respondent's level of political cynicism. The value assigned to each respondent is in parentheses next to the answer. Higher values denotes higher levels of political cynicism.

Do you think that quite a few of the people running the government are crooked, not very many are, or do you think hardly any of them are crooked?
(A) Quite a few (3)
(B) Not very many (2)
(C) Hardly any (1)
(D) Don't Know (NA)

This questions is the same used by and Dancey (2012) and ANES.

(6) Trust in institutions

Trust: Trust in institutions is measured using four questions from the ANES survey that measures trust. For each question a respondent is assigned a value between 0 and 1 dependent on their answer. The values they are assigned for each answer are in parentheses.

How much of the time do you think you can trust each of the following groups to do what is right?
Groups: "The federal government in Washington D.C." ; "Law enforcement" ; "The media" ; "People in general"
Possible Answers: "Almost never" (0) ; "Some of the time" (0.33) ; "Most of the time" (0.67) ; "Almost Always" (1.0)

How much do public officials care what people like you think?
(A) None at all (0)
(B) A little (0.25)
(C) A moderate amount (0.50)
(D) A lot (0.75)
(E) A great deal (1.0)

Do you think the government today has:
(A) Too little power (0)
(B) About the right amount of power (0.5)
(C) Too much power. (1.0)

How much can people like you affect what the government does?
(A) None at all (0)
(B) A little (0.25)
(C) A moderate amount (0.50)
(D) A lot (0.75)
(E) A great deal (1.0)

$Trust\_Score_i$ is the average value each respondent received.

This method of measurement is the same as that used in the ANES and Miller, Saunders and Farhart (2016).

(7) Belief that fake news is a problem in general

We assign a value to the variables, $Fake\_news\_problem_i$ (wave 1) and $Fake\_news\_problem\_2_i$ (wave 2), depending on the value to the answer they choose for the question below.

How much of a problem do you think made-up news and information is in the country today?

(A) 4: A very big problem (4)
(B) 3 (3)
(C) 2 (2)
(D) 1, Not a problem at all (1)

(8) Belief that fake news is a problem in the mainstream media.

We assign a value to the variables, $Fake\_news\_MM_i$ (wave 1) and $Fake\_news\_MM\_2_i$ (wave 2), depending on the value to the answer they choose for the question below.

President Trump often accuses several major news outlets of being "fake news." Do you think "fake news" from the mainstream media is a real problem, or do you think the mainstream media are generally reliable and report the facts as best they can?

(A) 5: "Fake news" is a serious problem affecting the mainstream media. (5)
(B) 4 (4)
(C) 3 (3)
(D) 2 (2)
(E) 1: Mistakes by the mainstream media are rare, and I generally find what they report to be credible. (1)

A.2 Moderators

(1) Social media use

We measure the respondent's activity on Twitter and Facebook. We ask the following question:

How frequently do you: (1) Look at Twitter
(2) Post things on Twitter
(3) Look at Facebook
(4) Post things on Facebook

Possible responses: (A) At least 10 times a day (7)
(B) Several times a day (6)
(C) About once a day (5)
(D) 3 to 6 days a week (4)
(E) 1 to 2 days a week (3)
(F) Every few weeks (2)
(G) 1 to 2 days a week (1)
(H) Never (0)
(I) Don't Know (NA)

We create an index for social media frequency by taking the average of the values assigned to the variables $facebook\_post\_frequency_i$, $twitter\_post\_frequency_i$, $twitter\_view\_frequency_i$, and $facebook\_view\_frequency_i$. The average value of these variables are assigned to the variable $Social\_Media\_Freq_i$.

(2) Digital literacy

Digital literacy is measured using the following two grid questions.

The first grid question asks for respondent's familiarity with the following terms on a five point scale (1 representing no understanding and 5 representing full understanding):
(1) Phishing
(2) JPG
(3) Cache
(4) Malware
(5) RSS
(6) Hashtag

The second grid question asks respondents' agreement with the following statements on a scale of -4 = Strongly Disagree to 4 = Strongly Agree:
(1) I prefer to ask friends how to use any new technological gadget instead of trying to figure it out myself.
(2) I feel like information technology is a part of my daily life.
(3) Using information technology makes it easier to do my work.
(4) I often have trouble finding things that I've saved on my computer.

Note: The value for one and four are reverse coded.

By summing all of the values we can create a digital literacy score that is assigned to the variable: DL_Score_i for each respondent. We take the inverse to determine if the effect size increased with lower levels of digital literacy.

(4) Online news consumption

The number of non-successive domains with NewsGuard scores before the respondent took the wave 1 survey (from May 15th to the first day of wave 1). The sum of non-successive domains with NewsGuard scores after the treatment.

(5) Partisan news diet

Using web tracking data from before individuals are treated we analyze web tracking data. We average the partisanship scores from domains visited to create a measure of news diet partisanship. The partisanship scores are derived from Eady et al. (N.d.) and each domain visited if in the Eady et al. (N.d.) list is given a partisanship score. If it is not in the list it is not used. The average partisanship score is assigned to the variable $partisanship\_new\_diet_i$.

(6) Prior visits to online publishers of fake news

The sum of the $domain\_unreliable\_dummy_j$ scores
assigned to domains visited by the respondent divided by number of non-successive domains with NewsGuard scores before the respondent took the wave 1 survey.

(7) Those who use the Safari web browser

A dummy variable that is assigned "1" if the browser the respondent is using the Safari browser to take the survey and possibly download the extension (Yes: 1 ; No: 0).

A.3 List of pre-treatment covariates for possible inclusion

Our list of pre-treatment covariates for possible inclusion are: gender ($Female_i$ dummy), education level ($Education_i$), age (Age_i), age squared (Age_i^2), 7-point party id ($Party\_ID_i$), race/ethnicity ($Ethnicity_i$), 7-point ideology ($Con\_Ideology_i$), media trust ($Media\_Trust\_Index_i$), social media use ($Social\_Media\_Freq_i$), trust in information from newspapers ($trust\_newspapers_i$), trust in information from social media ($trust\_socmed_i$), news consumption ($trad\_news\_network_i$, $trad\_news\_cable_i$, $trad\_news\_print_i$, $trad\_news\_public_i$, $trad\_news\_talk_i$, $trad\_news\_desk_i$, $trad\_news\_mobile_i$), browser used, pre-treatment version of the DV (if available and not already listed), logged number of visits to domains with NewsGuard scores (if DV is a Pulse count).

B Descriptive Statistics

B.1 Descriptive statistics for sample by treatment and control groups

Below, we present the summary statistic for those who completed both waves and those who only completed the first wave.

Group	Observ.	Age	Dig. Lit.	Income	Gender (Prop. Female)	Race (Prop. White)	Education	Ideology
Control and did not take the Wave 2 survey	220	48.99	48.21	6.23	0.61	0.76	3.86	-0.39
Control and took both surveys	1339	56.73	47.11	6.64	0.54	0.80	4.02	-0.19
Treated and did not take the Wave 2 survey	304	48.39	47.11	6.55	0.58	0.79	4.00	-0.46
Treated and took both surveys	1998	54.55	47.92	6.44	0.56	0.80	4.04	-0.28

B.2 Descriptive statistics for sample by treatment and control groups by attrition

Below, we present the summary statistic for groups that completed both waves and those that only completed one wave. 14.1% of respondents in the control group did not take the second wave survey. 13.2% of respondents in the treatment group did not take the second wave survey.

Group	Observ.	Age	Dig. Lit.	Income	Gender (Prop. Female)	Race (Prop. White)	Education	Ideology
Control and we do not have digital trace data	1035	55.78	46.92	6.76	0.55	0.78	4.00	3.77
Control and we have digital trace data	304	59.94	47.77	6.23	0.51	0.85	4.07	3.94
Treated and we do not have digital trace data	1461	52.96	48.27	6.51	0.55	0.79	4.01	3.67
Treated and we have digital trace data	537	58.87	46.97	6.24	0.59	0.86	4.09	3.85

B.3 Descriptive statistics for sample by compliance status

In the following figures, we show estimated means along various dimensions for respondents who would install the NewsGuard web browser extension if and only if they are assigned to receive it ("compliers") and those who would not under any circumstances ("never-takers") computed following the procedure in Marbach and Hangartner (2020). Points show estimated means for the complete sample, respondents who would take the treatment only if encouraged to install it ("compliers"), and respondents who would not take the treatment even if encouraged to install it ("never-taker") computed following Marbach and Hangartner (2020). All variables are rescaled to the 0 to 1 interval. Lines display 95% confidence intervals based on bootstrapped standard errors. Asterisks on variable names indicates that the mean values for compliers and never-takers are significantly different ($p < .05$).

Figure 1: Profile of all compliers and never-takers



Figure 2: Profile of compliers and never-takers with whom we collect web-browsing data



B.4 Descriptive Statistics for NewsGuard Ratings

A histogram of NewsGuard scores is listed below:

Figure 3: Histogram of NewsGuard Scores



C Results From All Covariate-Adjusted Models

C.1 Behavioral Measures (Before July 1st)

Table 1: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Unreliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0019	−0.0022	−0.0025
	(0.0028)	(0.0030)	(0.0035)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.8631***	0.8642***	0.8571***
	(0.0508)	(0.0511)	(0.0533)
R^2	0.8212	0.8211	0.8137
Adj. R^2	0.8208	0.8207	0.8132
Num. obs.	821	806	786

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 2: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Reliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0075	−0.0065	−0.0060
	(0.0125)	(0.0132)	(0.0150)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.7992***	0.7958***	0.8034***
	(0.0226)	(0.0231)	(0.0229)
R^2	0.6614	0.6552	0.6662
Adj. R^2	0.6605	0.6544	0.6653
Num. obs.	821	806	786

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 3: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Unreliable News Consumed with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0409	0.0443	0.0500
	(0.0216)	(0.0227)	(0.0263)
Age-Squared	0.0000***	0.0000***	0.0000***
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.8420***	0.8422***	0.8346***
	(0.0261)	(0.0266)	(0.0271)
Log of news viewed	0.0386***	0.0386***	0.0399***
	(0.0061)	(0.0062)	(0.0064)
R^2	0.7246	0.7214	0.7156
Adj. R^2	0.7233	0.7201	0.7142
Num. obs.	854	838	814

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 4: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Reliable News Consumed with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0100	−0.0100	−0.0091
	(0.0194)	(0.0205)	(0.0234)
Age	0.0048***	0.0049***	0.0046***
	(0.0008)	(0.0008)	(0.0008)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.5013***	0.5019***	0.4968***
	(0.0367)	(0.0376)	(0.0382)
Log of news viewed	0.2079***	0.2075***	0.2109***
	(0.0170)	(0.0175)	(0.0179)
R^2	0.8668	0.8643	0.8650
Adj. R^2	0.8661	0.8636	0.8643
Num. obs.	854	838	814

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 5: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Reliability Score of News Diet with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.4702	0.5048	0.5649
	(0.3221)	(0.3346)	(0.3853)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.8184***	0.8227***	0.8213***
	(0.0357)	(0.0351)	(0.0367)
R^2	0.6676	0.6738	0.6657
Adj. R^2	0.6668	0.6730	0.6649
Num. obs.	821	806	786

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

C.2 Behavioral Measures (After July 1st)

Table 6: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Unreliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0043	−0.0043	−0.0031
	(0.0035)	(0.0037)	(0.0042)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.7979***	0.7984***	0.8222***
	(0.0619)	(0.0622)	(0.0596)
R^2	0.7465	0.7462	0.7621
Adj. R^2	0.7459	0.7455	0.7615
Num. obs.	763	750	729

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 7: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Reliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0013	−0.0005	−0.0011
	(0.0142)	(0.0149)	(0.0168)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.7733***	0.7727***	0.7869***
	(0.0247)	(0.0253)	(0.0247)
R^2	0.6084	0.6032	0.6201
Adj. R^2	0.6074	0.6021	0.6191
Num. obs.	763	750	729

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 8: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Unreliable News Consumed with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0062	0.0062	0.0141
	(0.0192)	(0.0202)	(0.0233)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.7034***	0.7080***	0.7047***
	(0.0291)	(0.0298)	(0.0306)
R^2	0.6546	0.6525	0.6498
Adj. R^2	0.6538	0.6517	0.6489
Num. obs.	846	829	805

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 9: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Reliable News Consumed with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0240	−0.0267	−0.0372
	(0.0314)	(0.0330)	(0.0373)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.5667***	0.5662***	0.5724***
	(0.0489)	(0.0499)	(0.0512)
Log of news viewed	0.1426***	0.1427***	0.1447***
	(0.0224)	(0.0229)	(0.0236)
R^2	0.7180	0.7146	0.7228
Adj. R^2	0.7169	0.7136	0.7217
Num. obs.	811	797	774

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 10: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Reliability Score of News Diet with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.5667	0.5644	0.5934
	(0.3577)	(0.3722)	(0.4201)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.7583***	0.7705***	0.7845***
	(0.0428)	(0.0423)	(0.0402)
R^2	0.6095	0.6206	0.6288
Adj. R^2	0.6085	0.6196	0.6278
Num. obs.	763	750	729

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

C.3 Behavioral Measures - Weighted by Duration (Before July 1st)

Table 11: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Unreliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st) – Duration Weighted

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0048	−0.0049	−0.0056
	(0.0036)	(0.0038)	(0.0045)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.8476***	0.8481***	0.8406***
	(0.0521)	(0.0522)	(0.0545)
R^2	0.7541	0.7537	0.7433
Adj. R^2	0.7535	0.7531	0.7427
Num. obs.	821	806	786

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 12: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Reliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st) – Duration Weighted

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0013	0.0027	0.0007
	(0.0151)	(0.0158)	(0.0182)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.7521***	0.7475***	0.7483***
	(0.0233)	(0.0237)	(0.0244)
R^2	0.5892	0.5824	0.5805
Adj. R^2	0.5882	0.5814	0.5795
Num. obs.	821	806	786

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 13: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Unreliable News Consumed with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st) – Duration Weighted

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−263.1468	−286.1545	−330.9852
	(159.9564)	(171.2872)	(199.9503)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.9670***	0.9680***	0.9683***
	(0.2059)	(0.2069)	(0.2076)
R^2	0.7408	0.7411	0.7410
Adj. R^2	0.7402	0.7405	0.7404
Num. obs.	891	872	848

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 14: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Reliable News Consumed with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st) – Duration Weighted

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	971.1443	923.8793	1275.1953
	(2127.7790)	(2257.1809)	(2644.3343)
Pre-Treatment Value	1.0578^{***}	1.0576^{***}	1.0567^{***}
	(0.0814)	(0.0814)	(0.0815)
R^2	0.7071	0.7070	0.7064
Adj. R^2	0.7065	0.7064	0.7057
Num. obs.	891	872	848

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 15: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Reliability Score of News Diet with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st) – Duration Weighted

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.5953	0.6506	0.6352
	(0.4026)	(0.4217)	(0.4853)
Party ID	-0.2751^{*}	-0.2491^{*}	-0.2762^{*}
	(0.1245)	(0.1240)	(0.1260)
Ideology	−0.2606	−0.2860	−0.2650
	(0.1488)	(0.1466)	(0.1494)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.7466^{***}	0.7497^{***}	0.7469^{***}
	(0.0464)	(0.0466)	(0.0481)
R^2	0.5843	0.5867	0.5778
Adj. R^2	0.5823	0.5846	0.5756
Num. obs.	821	806	786

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

C.4 Behavioral Measures - Weighted by Duration (After July 1st)

Table 16: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Unreliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st) – Duration Weighted

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0060	−0.0065	−0.0055
	(0.0046)	(0.0049)	(0.0056)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.8418***	0.8438***	0.8648***
	(0.0577)	(0.0577)	(0.0563)
R^2	0.7064	0.7076	0.7158
Adj. R^2	0.7056	0.7068	0.7150
Num. obs.	761	748	727

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 17: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Reliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st) – Duration Weighted

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0011	0.0042	0.0059
	(0.0176)	(0.0186)	(0.0210)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.6997***	0.6945***	0.7142***
	(0.0283)	(0.0288)	(0.0286)
R^2	0.5011	0.4939	0.5142
Adj. R^2	0.4998	0.4925	0.5128
Num. obs.	761	748	727

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 18: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Unreliable News Consumed with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st) – Duration Weighted

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−123.5642	−124.8044	−140.8097
	(162.4097)	(171.1623)	(201.6918)
R^2	0.0010	0.0005	−0.0004
Adj. R^2	−0.0002	−0.0006	−0.0016
Num. obs.	884	867	839

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 19: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Reliable News Consumed with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st) – Duration Weighted

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	2073.2925	2200.9569	2575.8879
	(1475.2341)	(1566.0089)	(1842.3836)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.4019***	0.4015***	0.4009***
	(0.1035)	(0.1037)	(0.1039)
R^2	0.5724	0.5722	0.5721
Adj. R^2	0.5714	0.5712	0.5711
Num. obs.	846	829	805

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 20: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Reliability Score of News Diet with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st) – Duration Weighted

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.6736	0.7206	0.7293
	(0.4559)	(0.4726)	(0.5387)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.7395***	0.7531***	0.7561***
	(0.0509)	(0.0507)	(0.0522)
R^2	0.5309	0.5440	0.5411
Adj. R^2	0.5297	0.5427	0.5399
Num. obs.	761	748	727

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

C.5 Behavioral Measures - Referrals from Social Media Sites and Search Engines (Before July 1st)

Table 21: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet of Referrals From Search Engines and Social Media (Google, Twitter, and Facebook) That is Unreliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0035	−0.0046	−0.0055
	(0.0068)	(0.0072)	(0.0083)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.6561***	0.6589***	0.6272***
	(0.0933)	(0.0938)	(0.0959)
R^2	0.4071	0.4089	0.3717
Adj. R^2	0.4053	0.4070	0.3696
Num. obs.	649	638	620

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 22: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet of Referrals From Search Engines and Social Media (Google, Twitter, and Facebook) That is Reliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0295	−0.0283	−0.0351
	(0.0166)	(0.0174)	(0.0201)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.6616***	0.6568***	0.6504***
	(0.0337)	(0.0345)	(0.0360)
R^2	0.4471	0.4384	0.4275
Adj. R^2	0.4454	0.4367	0.4257
Num. obs.	649	638	620

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 23: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Unreliable News Referred From Search Engines and Social Media (Google, Twitter, and Facebook) with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0050	−0.0078	−0.0086
	(0.0167)	(0.0174)	(0.0202)
Log of news viewed	0.0237***	0.0233***	0.0228***
	(0.0046)	(0.0047)	(0.0047)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.8034***	0.7996***	0.7902***
	(0.0525)	(0.0530)	(0.0537)
R^2	0.6074	0.6041	0.5963
Adj. R^2	0.6057	0.6024	0.5945
Num. obs.	700	689	668

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 24: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Reliable News Referred From Search Engines and Social Media (Google, Twitter, and Facebook) with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0105	−0.0130	−0.0140
	(0.0241)	(0.0251)	(0.0290)
Log of news viewed	0.0848***	0.0837***	0.0846***
	(0.0112)	(0.0113)	(0.0115)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.7563***	0.7564***	0.7626***
	(0.0255)	(0.0258)	(0.0264)
R^2	0.7794	0.7781	0.7828
Adj. R^2	0.7785	0.7772	0.7818
Num. obs.	700	689	668

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 25: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Reliability Score of News Referred From Search Engines and Social Media (Google, Twitter, and Facebook) with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.8349	0.8852	0.9550
	(0.6286)	(0.6595)	(0.7581)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.5965***	0.5869***	0.5808***
	(0.0711)	(0.0714)	(0.0742)
R^2	0.3999	0.3933	0.3792
Adj. R^2	0.3980	0.3914	0.3772
Num. obs.	649	638	620

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

C.6 Behavioral Measures - Referrals from Social Media Sites and Search Engines (After July 1st)

Table 26: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet of Referrals From Search Engines and Social Media (Google, Twitter, and Facebook) That is Unreliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0037	0.0037	0.0048
	(0.0067)	(0.0072)	(0.0083)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.6389***	0.6386***	0.6342***
	(0.0889)	(0.0891)	(0.0971)
R^2	0.4539	0.4535	0.4310
Adj. R^2	0.4519	0.4514	0.4288
Num. obs.	548	538	522

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 27: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion News Diet of Referrals From Search Engines and Social Media (Google, Twitter, and Facebook) That is Reliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0126	0.0166	0.0102
	(0.0195)	(0.0206)	(0.0228)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.6370***	0.6310***	0.6546***
	(0.0382)	(0.0393)	(0.0396)
R^2	0.3934	0.3832	0.4026
Adj. R^2	0.3912	0.3809	0.4003
Num. obs.	548	538	522

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 28: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Unreliable News Referred From Search Engines and Social Media (Google, Twitter, and Facebook) with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0128	0.0097	0.0156
	(0.0159)	(0.0166)	(0.0193)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.5838***	0.5868***	0.5773***
	(0.0490)	(0.0499)	(0.0514)
R^2	0.5015	0.5028	0.4885
Adj. R^2	0.4999	0.5011	0.4868
Num. obs.	612	601	582

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 29: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Reliable News Referred From Search Engines and Social Media (Google, Twitter, and Facebook) with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0135	0.0164	0.0057
	(0.0306)	(0.0323)	(0.0370)
Age	0.0042***	0.0043***	0.0043***
	(0.0012)	(0.0012)	(0.0012)
Log of news viewed	0.0504***	0.0495***	0.0531***
	(0.0123)	(0.0126)	(0.0129)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.7207***	0.7204***	0.7231***
	(0.0279)	(0.0283)	(0.0291)
R^2	0.6932	0.6908	0.6928
Adj. R^2	0.6912	0.6887	0.6907
Num. obs.	608	597	578

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 30: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Reliability Score of News Referred From Search Engines and Social Media (Google, Twitter, and Facebook) with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.1765	0.2247	0.2338
	(0.6905)	(0.7352)	(0.8291)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.5535***	0.5430***	0.5196***
	(0.1019)	(0.1026)	(0.1051)
R^2	0.3256	0.3159	0.2925
Adj. R^2	0.3231	0.3133	0.2898
Num. obs.	548	538	522

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

C.7 Attitudinal Measures

Table 31: Testing Effect of Intervention on Belief in Misinformation about the Black Lives Matter Movement with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0206	−0.0219	−0.0225
	(0.0297)	(0.0317)	(0.0380)
Web Browser (Safari)	−0.1440***	−0.1481***	−0.1391***
	(0.0409)	(0.0411)	(0.0421)
Party ID	0.0135	0.0142	0.0133
	(0.0118)	(0.0120)	(0.0124)
Education	−0.0291**	−0.0337**	−0.0325**
	(0.0110)	(0.0111)	(0.0113)
Gender	0.0756*	0.0731*	0.0624*
	(0.0301)	(0.0304)	(0.0310)
Age	0.0018	0.0021	0.0015
	(0.0011)	(0.0011)	(0.0012)
Trust in Media	−0.1892***	−0.1786***	−0.1695***
	(0.0229)	(0.0231)	(0.0236)
Ideology	0.1027***	0.1039***	0.1054***
	(0.0122)	(0.0125)	(0.0129)
News consumption (network news)	0.0218*	0.0212*	0.0253*
	(0.0107)	(0.0108)	(0.0110)
News consumption (print news)	0.0543***	0.0507***	0.0472***
	(0.0130)	(0.0133)	(0.0135)
News consumption (talk radio)	0.0601***	0.0580***	0.0616***
	(0.0128)	(0.0129)	(0.0133)
News consumption (news on desktop)	−0.0535***	−0.0535***	−0.0587***
	(0.0128)	(0.0128)	(0.0133)
News consumption (news on mobile)	−0.0282**	−0.0278**	−0.0278*
	(0.0105)	(0.0106)	(0.0108)
Trust of news in newspapers_sm	0.0035***	0.0034***	0.0032***
	(0.0007)	(0.0007)	(0.0007)
Trust of news in newspapers	−0.1067***	−0.1091***	−0.1099***
	(0.0184)	(0.0185)	(0.0189)
R^2	0.2916	0.2926	0.2928
Adj. R^2	0.2875	0.2885	0.2885
Num. obs.	2662	2588	2491

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 32: Testing Effect of Intervention on Belief in True Information about the Black Lives Matter Movement with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0115	−0.0016	−0.0041
	(0.0265)	(0.0284)	(0.0340)
Party ID	−0.0159	−0.0164	−0.0180
	(0.0098)	(0.0100)	(0.0101)
Trust in Media	0.1577***	0.1600***	0.1629***
	(0.0197)	(0.0200)	(0.0202)
Ideology	−0.0786***	−0.0759***	−0.0745***
	(0.0101)	(0.0103)	(0.0105)
R^2	0.1390	0.1370	0.1421
Adj. R^2	0.1379	0.1359	0.1410
Num. obs.	3193	3104	2982

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 33: Testing Effect of Intervention on Belief in Misinformation about Covid-19 with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0012	0.0034	0.0187
	(0.0267)	(0.0281)	(0.0334)
Party ID	0.0381^{***}	0.0413^{***}	0.0385^{**}
	(0.0114)	(0.0115)	(0.0117)
Race/Ethnicity	-0.1640^{***}	-0.1844^{***}	-0.1947^{***}
	(0.0351)	(0.0354)	(0.0369)
Education	-0.0436^{***}	-0.0472^{***}	-0.0477^{***}
	(0.0096)	(0.0096)	(0.0097)
Trust in Media	-0.2358^{***}	-0.2272^{***}	-0.2158^{***}
	(0.0199)	(0.0198)	(0.0203)
Ideology	0.0695^{***}	0.0728^{***}	0.0754^{***}
	(0.0117)	(0.0118)	(0.0121)
News consumption (print news)	0.0606^{***}	0.0562^{***}	0.0529^{***}
	(0.0111)	(0.0110)	(0.0112)
News consumption (talk radio)	0.0500^{***}	0.0455^{***}	0.0456^{***}
	(0.0116)	(0.0116)	(0.0119)
Trust of news in newspapers_sm	0.0055^{***}	0.0051^{***}	0.0052^{***}
	(0.0006)	(0.0006)	(0.0006)
Trust of news in newspapers	-0.0882^{***}	-0.0826^{***}	-0.0844^{***}
	(0.0161)	(0.0161)	(0.0161)
R^2	0.3182	0.3254	0.3214
Adj. R^2	0.3157	0.3229	0.3188
Num. obs.	2729	2652	2549

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 34: Testing Effect of Intervention on Belief in True Information about Covid-19 with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0004	0.0134	0.0119
	(0.0183)	(0.0195)	(0.0233)
Trust in Media	0.0896***	0.0855***	0.0781***
	(0.0144)	(0.0143)	(0.0145)
Ideology	−0.0259***	−0.0291***	−0.0293***
	(0.0056)	(0.0055)	(0.0056)
News consumption (talk radio)	−0.0428***	−0.0403***	−0.0439***
	(0.0082)	(0.0083)	(0.0084)
Trust of news in newspapers	0.0719***	0.0689***	0.0696***
	(0.0113)	(0.0113)	(0.0115)
R^2	0.1122	0.1129	0.1135
Adj. R^2	0.1108	0.1115	0.1121
Num. obs.	3267	3172	3048

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 35: Testing Effect of Intervention on Trust in Media with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0303	0.0263	0.0373
	(0.0200)	(0.0214)	(0.0258)
Party ID	-0.0550^{***}	-0.0569^{***}	-0.0590^{***}
	(0.0076)	(0.0078)	(0.0079)
Trust in Media	0.5555^{***}	0.5529^{***}	0.5635^{***}
	(0.0154)	(0.0156)	(0.0160)
Ideology	-0.0564^{***}	-0.0537^{***}	-0.0503^{***}
	(0.0075)	(0.0076)	(0.0077)
Trust of news in newspapers	0.0771^{***}	0.0813^{***}	0.0750^{***}
	(0.0115)	(0.0116)	(0.0118)
R^2	0.6003	0.6006	0.6061
Adj. R^2	0.5997	0.5999	0.6054
Num. obs.	3335	3237	3108

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 36: Testing Effect of Intervention on Affective Polarization with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0276	0.0602	0.0811
	(0.5763)	(0.6108)	(0.7286)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.8702***	0.8675***	0.8678***
	(0.0095)	(0.0097)	(0.0098)
R^2	0.7159	0.7173	0.7198
Adj. R^2	0.7157	0.7172	0.7196
Num. obs.	3193	3103	2987

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 37: Testing Effect of Intervention on Whether They Believe "Fake News is a Problem" with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.5486^{***}	0.5483^{***}	0.5582^{***}
	(0.0175)	(0.0177)	(0.0181)
Treatment	-0.0093	-0.0122	-0.0118
	(0.0224)	(0.0239)	(0.0289)
Party ID	0.0159	0.0198^{*}	0.0201^{*}
	(0.0084)	(0.0084)	(0.0086)
Trust in Media	-0.1056^{***}	-0.1039^{***}	-0.1055^{***}
	(0.0172)	(0.0175)	(0.0180)
Ideology	0.0317^{***}	0.0292^{***}	0.0271^{**}
	(0.0088)	(0.0088)	(0.0091)
R^2	0.3984	0.4013	0.4109
Adj. R^2	0.3975	0.4004	0.4099
Num. obs.	3335	3237	3108

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 38: Testing Effect of Intervention on Whether They Believe "Fake News is a Problem in the Mainstream Media" with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.5867^{***}	0.5917^{***}	0.5935^{***}
	(0.0205)	(0.0209)	(0.0213)
Treatment	-0.0426	-0.0416	-0.0361
	(0.0293)	(0.0313)	(0.0376)
Party ID	0.0635^{***}	0.0608^{***}	0.0618^{***}
	(0.0127)	(0.0130)	(0.0130)
Trust in Media	-0.2554^{***}	-0.2570^{***}	-0.2579^{***}
	(0.0275)	(0.0278)	(0.0283)
Ideology	0.0869^{***}	0.0844^{***}	0.0801^{***}
	(0.0129)	(0.0131)	(0.0134)
Trust of news in newspapers	-0.1062^{***}	-0.1059^{***}	-0.1089^{***}
	(0.0192)	(0.0195)	(0.0199)
R^2	0.7355	0.7362	0.7397
Adj. R^2	0.7350	0.7357	0.7392
Num. obs.	3334	3236	3107

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 39: Testing Effect of Intervention on Trust in Institutions with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.2431	0.3362	0.2293
	(0.3756)	(0.3984)	(0.4781)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.7389^{***}	0.7419^{***}	0.7438^{***}
	(0.0133)	(0.0131)	(0.0134)
R^2	0.5870	0.5937	0.5922
Adj. R^2	0.5867	0.5934	0.5919
Num. obs.	3007	2922	2815

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 40: Testing Effect of Intervention on Trust in CBS with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0440	0.0411	0.0440
	(0.0281)	(0.0299)	(0.0358)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.4610***	0.4626***	0.4567***
	(0.0214)	(0.0216)	(0.0220)
Party ID	−0.0417***	−0.0415***	−0.0448***
	(0.0105)	(0.0105)	(0.0107)
Trust in Media	0.1899***	0.1903***	0.1818***
	(0.0215)	(0.0217)	(0.0222)
Ideology	−0.0485***	−0.0471***	−0.0460***
	(0.0111)	(0.0113)	(0.0115)
News consumption (network news)	0.0711***	0.0733***	0.0719***
	(0.0101)	(0.0102)	(0.0104)
Trust of news in newspapers_sm	0.0031***	0.0032***	0.0031***
	(0.0006)	(0.0006)	(0.0007)
Trust of news in newspapers	0.0485**	0.0497**	0.0603**
	(0.0187)	(0.0189)	(0.0193)
R^2	0.5739	0.5767	0.5770
Adj. R^2	0.5726	0.5753	0.5755
Num. obs.	2472	2401	2304

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 41: Testing Effect of Intervention on Trust in ABC with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0303	0.0301	0.0349
	(0.0284)	(0.0300)	(0.0361)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.4644^{***}	0.4719^{***}	0.4748^{***}
	(0.0222)	(0.0223)	(0.0228)
Party ID	-0.0554^{***}	-0.0539^{***}	-0.0585^{***}
	(0.0108)	(0.0108)	(0.0111)
Trust in Media	0.1521^{***}	0.1522^{***}	0.1329^{***}
	(0.0229)	(0.0228)	(0.0230)
Ideology	-0.0526^{***}	-0.0520^{***}	-0.0513^{***}
	(0.0114)	(0.0116)	(0.0119)
News consumption (network news)	0.0636^{***}	0.0653^{***}	0.0646^{***}
	(0.0103)	(0.0104)	(0.0106)
Trust of news in newspapers_sm	0.0033^{***}	0.0033^{***}	0.0033^{***}
	(0.0006)	(0.0006)	(0.0006)
Trust of news in newspapers	0.0347	0.0334	0.0408^{*}
	(0.0194)	(0.0196)	(0.0199)
R^2	0.5648	0.5709	0.5755
Adj. R^2	0.5634	0.5694	0.5740
Num. obs.	2451	2382	2289

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 42: Testing Effect of Intervention on Trust in NBC with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0238	0.0283	0.0296
	(0.0272)	(0.0287)	(0.0346)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.4703^{***}	0.4756^{***}	0.4762^{***}
	(0.0220)	(0.0220)	(0.0223)
Party ID	-0.0536^{***}	-0.0514^{***}	-0.0537^{***}
	(0.0105)	(0.0106)	(0.0106)
Trust in Media	0.1856^{***}	0.1971^{***}	0.1806^{***}
	(0.0226)	(0.0230)	(0.0233)
Ideology	-0.0515^{***}	-0.0499^{***}	-0.0503^{***}
	(0.0112)	(0.0114)	(0.0116)
News consumption (network news)	0.0614^{***}	0.0613^{***}	0.0611^{***}
	(0.0099)	(0.0099)	(0.0101)
Trust of news in newspapers_sm	0.0031^{***}	0.0031^{***}	0.0030^{***}
	(0.0006)	(0.0006)	(0.0006)
Trust of news in newspapers	0.0440^{*}	0.0422^{*}	0.0507^{**}
	(0.0184)	(0.0184)	(0.0188)
R^2	0.6064	0.6137	0.6149
Adj. R^2	0.6051	0.6124	0.6136
Num. obs.	2447	2379	2287

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 43: Testing Effect of Intervention on Trust in CNN with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0149	0.0196	0.0248
	(0.0249)	(0.0266)	(0.0320)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.5751^{***}	0.5744^{***}	0.5639^{***}
	(0.0182)	(0.0183)	(0.0188)
Party ID	-0.0753^{***}	-0.0757^{***}	-0.0782^{***}
	(0.0104)	(0.0106)	(0.0109)
Trust in Media	0.1922^{***}	0.1935^{***}	0.2006^{***}
	(0.0200)	(0.0203)	(0.0209)
Ideology	-0.0375^{***}	-0.0376^{***}	-0.0373^{**}
	(0.0108)	(0.0111)	(0.0113)
R^2	0.6601	0.6618	0.6636
Adj. R^2	0.6595	0.6612	0.6630
Num. obs.	2887	2806	2691

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 44: Testing Effect of Intervention on Trust in Fox News with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0026	−0.0012	−0.0100
	(0.0231)	(0.0243)	(0.0294)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.6468***	0.6427***	0.6449***
	(0.0176)	(0.0179)	(0.0182)
Party ID	0.0263**	0.0277**	0.0254**
	(0.0086)	(0.0086)	(0.0088)
Ideology	0.0734***	0.0752***	0.0758***
	(0.0095)	(0.0097)	(0.0099)
R^2	0.6046	0.6078	0.6084
Adj. R^2	0.6040	0.6073	0.6079
Num. obs.	2883	2805	2692

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

D Results From All Covariate-Unadjusted Models

D.1 Behavioral Measures (Before July 1st)

Table 45: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Unreliable with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0005	0.0006	−0.0006
	(0.0071)	(0.0075)	(0.0086)
R^2	0.0000	0.0000	−0.0000
Adj. R^2	−0.0012	−0.0011	−0.0013
Num. obs.	857	841	818

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 46: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Reliable with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0110	−0.0105	−0.0185
	(0.0215)	(0.0225)	(0.0257)
R^2	0.0003	0.0005	0.0005
Adj. R^2	−0.0009	−0.0007	−0.0007
Num. obs.	857	841	818

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 47: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Unreliable News Consumed with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0290	0.0338	0.0373
	(0.0395)	(0.0414)	(0.0475)
R^2	0.0006	0.0012	0.0015
Adj. R^2	−0.0005	0.0001	0.0004
Num. obs.	904	885	860

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 48: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Reliable News Consumed with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0161	−0.0029	−0.0034
	(0.0597)	(0.0623)	(0.0717)
R^2	0.0001	−0.0001	−0.0001
Adj. R^2	−0.0010	−0.0012	−0.0012
Num. obs.	904	885	860

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 49: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Reliability Score of News Diet with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0549	0.1503	0.1080
	(0.5771)	(0.6023)	(0.6867)
R^2	0.0000	0.0000	−0.0001
Adj. R^2	−0.0012	−0.0012	−0.0013
Num. obs.	857	841	818

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

D.2 Behavioral Measures (After July 1st)

Table 50: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Unreliable with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0016	−0.0013	−0.0010
	(0.0074)	(0.0078)	(0.0091)
R^2	0.0001	−0.0000	0.0002
Adj. R^2	−0.0012	−0.0013	−0.0010
Num. obs.	813	800	774

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 51: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Reliable with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0111	0.0129	0.0094
	(0.0223)	(0.0233)	(0.0269)
R^2	0.0003	−0.0001	0.0002
Adj. R^2	−0.0009	−0.0013	−0.0011
Num. obs.	813	800	774

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 52: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Unreliable News Consumed with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0090	0.0114	0.0200
	(0.0326)	(0.0342)	(0.0395)
R^2	0.0001	0.0003	0.0000
Adj. R^2	−0.0010	−0.0008	−0.0012
Num. obs.	884	867	839

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 53: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Reliable News Consumed with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0403	−0.0270	−0.0368
	(0.0578)	(0.0602)	(0.0701)
R^2	0.0005	−0.0002	−0.0011
Adj. R^2	−0.0006	−0.0013	−0.0023
Num. obs.	884	867	839

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 54: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Reliability Score of News Diet with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.1774	0.2296	0.1439
	(0.5990)	(0.6268)	(0.7222)
R^2	0.0001	0.0000	0.0004
Adj. R^2	−0.0011	−0.0012	−0.0009
Num. obs.	813	800	774

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

D.3 Behavioral Measures - Weighted by Duration (Before July 1st)

Table 55: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Unreliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st) – Duration Weighted

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treated	−0.0036	−0.0034	−0.0053
	(0.0075)	(0.0079)	(0.0090)
R^2	0.0003	−0.0001	−0.0003
Adj. R^2	−0.0009	−0.0013	−0.0015
Num. obs.	856	840	817

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 56: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Reliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st) – Duration Weighted

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treated	−0.0035	−0.0023	−0.0126
	(0.0232)	(0.0242)	(0.0276)
R^2	0.0000	0.0000	−0.0000
Adj. R^2	−0.0011	−0.0012	−0.0012
Num. obs.	856	840	817

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 57: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Unreliable News Consumed with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st) – Duration Weighted

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treated	−457.2273	−475.0275	−554.2217
	(350.1165)	(370.3970)	(433.1678)
R^2	0.0028	0.0020	−0.0004
Adj. R^2	0.0017	0.0008	−0.0016
Num. obs.	904	885	860

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 58: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Reliable News Consumed with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st) – Duration Weighted

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treated	1578.2085	1734.1659	2373.7616
	(4285.7158)	(4539.8499)	(5303.0171)
R^2	0.0001	0.0003	0.0008
Adj. R^2	−0.0010	−0.0008	−0.0004
Num. obs.	904	885	860

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 59: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Reliability Score of News Diet with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st) – Duration Weighted

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treated	0.4935	0.5961	0.5397
	(0.6256)	(0.6540)	(0.7463)
R^2	0.0007	0.0011	0.0006
Adj. R^2	−0.0004	−0.0001	−0.0006
Num. obs.	856	840	817

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

D.4 Behavioral Measures - Weighted by Duration (After July 1st)

Table 60: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Unreliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st) – Duration Weighted

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treated	−0.0049	−0.0050	−0.0055
	(0.0083)	(0.0087)	(0.0102)
R^2	0.0005	0.0000	0.0012
Adj. R^2	−0.0008	−0.0012	−0.0001
Num. obs.	811	798	772

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 61: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Reliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st) – Duration Weighted

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treated	0.0138	0.0176	0.0137
	(0.0240)	(0.0250)	(0.0288)
R^2	0.0004	0.0003	0.0006
Adj. R^2	−0.0008	−0.0010	−0.0007
Num. obs.	811	798	772

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 62: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Unreliable News Consumed with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st) – Duration Weighted

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treated	−123.5642	−124.8044	−140.8097
	(162.4097)	(171.1623)	(201.6918)
R^2	0.0010	0.0005	−0.0004
Adj. R^2	−0.0002	−0.0006	−0.0016
Num. obs.	884	867	839

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 63: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Reliable News Consumed with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st) – Duration Weighted

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treated	1827.2807	2006.9349	2438.3461
	(1762.6270)	(1860.7421)	(2188.5690)
R^2	0.0010	0.0015	0.0031
Adj. R^2	−0.0001	0.0004	0.0019
Num. obs.	884	867	839

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 64: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Reliability Score of News Diet with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st) – Duration Weighted

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treated	0.5698	0.6748	0.6405
	(0.6663)	(0.6985)	(0.8020)
R^2	0.0009	0.0009	0.0024
Adj. R^2	−0.0003	−0.0004	0.0011
Num. obs.	811	798	772

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

D.5 Behavioral Measures - Referrals from Social Media Sites and Search Engines (Before July 1st)

Table 65: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet of Referrals From Search Engines and Social Media (Google, Twitter, and Facebook) That is Unreliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treated	−0.0012	−0.0018	−0.0032
	(0.0082)	(0.0087)	(0.0098)
R^2	0.0000	0.0000	−0.0002
Adj. R^2	−0.0013	−0.0014	−0.0017
Num. obs.	733	721	700

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 66: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet of Referrals From Search Engines and Social Media (Google, Twitter, and Facebook) That is Reliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treated	−0.0284	−0.0273	−0.0364
	(0.0216)	(0.0225)	(0.0257)
R^2	0.0023	0.0019	0.0018
Adj. R^2	0.0010	0.0005	0.0003
Num. obs.	733	721	700

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 67: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Unreliable News Referred From Search Engines and Social Media (Google, Twitter, and Facebook) with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treated	−0.0117	−0.0139	−0.0147
	(0.0252)	(0.0262)	(0.0298)
R^2	0.0003	0.0001	−0.0003
Adj. R^2	−0.0010	−0.0012	−0.0017
Num. obs.	770	757	735

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 68: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Reliable News Referred From Search Engines and Social Media (Google, Twitter, and Facebook) with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treated	−0.0481	−0.0447	−0.0604
	(0.0497)	(0.0516)	(0.0595)
R^2	0.0012	0.0010	0.0029
Adj. R^2	−0.0001	−0.0003	0.0015
Num. obs.	770	757	735

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 69: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Reliability Score of News Referred From Search Engines and Social Media (Google, Twitter, and Facebook) with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treated	0.3393	0.4237	0.2932
	(0.7678)	(0.8001)	(0.9142)
R^2	0.0003	0.0009	0.0000
Adj. R^2	−0.0011	−0.0005	−0.0014
Num. obs.	733	721	700

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

D.6 Behavioral Measures - Referrals from Social Media Sites and Search Engines (After July 1st)

Table 70: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet of Referrals From Search Engines and Social Media (Google, Twitter, and Facebook) That is Unreliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treated	0.0088	0.0087	0.0093
	(0.0081)	(0.0085)	(0.0098)
R^2	0.0016	0.0023	0.0006
Adj. R^2	0.0000	0.0007	−0.0011
Num. obs.	630	620	598

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 71: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion News Diet of Referrals From Search Engines and Social Media (Google, Twitter, and Facebook) That is Reliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treated	0.0117	0.0156	0.0108
	(0.0234)	(0.0243)	(0.0279)
R^2	0.0004	0.0002	0.0007
Adj. R^2	−0.0012	−0.0014	−0.0009
Num. obs.	630	620	598

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 72: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Unreliable News Referred From Search Engines and Social Media (Google, Twitter, and Facebook) with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treated	0.0147	0.0118	0.0175
	(0.0210)	(0.0220)	(0.0251)
R^2	0.0008	0.0010	0.0006
Adj. R^2	−0.0007	−0.0005	−0.0009
Num. obs.	680	669	647

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 73: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Reliable News Referred From Search Engines and Social Media (Google, Twitter, and Facebook) with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treated	−0.0462	−0.0410	−0.0679
	(0.0501)	(0.0520)	(0.0601)
R^2	0.0013	0.0016	0.0027
Adj. R^2	−0.0002	0.0001	0.0011
Num. obs.	680	669	647

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 74: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Reliability Score of News Referred From Search Engines and Social Media (Google, Twitter, and Facebook) with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treated	−0.5662	−0.4744	−0.6503
	(0.8032)	(0.8397)	(0.9523)
R^2	0.0007	0.0011	−0.0002
Adj. R^2	−0.0008	−0.0005	−0.0018
Num. obs.	630	620	598

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

D.7 Attitudinal Measures

Table 75: Testing Effect of Intervention on Belief in Misinformation about the Black Lives Matter Movement with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	-0.0728^{*}	-0.0764^{*}	-0.0939^{*}
	(0.0323)	(0.0344)	(0.0414)
R^2	0.0016	0.0032	0.0063
Adj. R^2	0.0013	0.0029	0.0060
Num. obs.	3170	3079	2962

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 76: Testing Effect of Intervention on Belief in True Information about the Black Lives Matter Movement with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0004	0.0110	0.0162
	(0.0285)	(0.0305)	(0.0366)
R^2	0.0000	−0.0000	0.0002
Adj. R^2	−0.0003	−0.0003	−0.0001
Num. obs.	3195	3105	2983

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 77: Testing Effect of Intervention on Belief in Misinformation about Covid-19 with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0170	−0.0125	−0.0059
	(0.0288)	(0.0304)	(0.0363)
R^2	0.0001	0.0005	0.0005
Adj. R^2	−0.0002	0.0002	0.0001
Num. obs.	3263	3169	3044

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 78: Testing Effect of Intervention on Belief in True Information about Covid-19 with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0076	0.0202	0.0218
	(0.0196)	(0.0209)	(0.0249)
R^2	0.0000	0.0007	0.0016
Adj. R^2	−0.0003	0.0004	0.0013
Num. obs.	3270	3174	3050

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 79: Testing Effect of Intervention on Trust in Media with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0478	0.0413	0.0627
	(0.0316)	(0.0338)	(0.0410)
R^2	0.0007	0.0011	0.0022
Adj. R^2	0.0004	0.0008	0.0019
Num. obs.	3337	3238	3109

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 80: Testing Effect of Intervention on Affective Polarization with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.3371	−0.3549	−0.8156
	(1.0770)	(1.1467)	(1.3733)
R^2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0002
Adj. R^2	−0.0003	−0.0003	−0.0001
Num. obs.	3237	3143	3021

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 81: Testing Effect of Intervention on Whether They Believe "Fake News is a Problem" with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0107	−0.0143	−0.0143
	(0.0288)	(0.0309)	(0.0375)
R^2	0.0000	0.0002	0.0002
Adj. R^2	−0.0003	−0.0001	−0.0002
Num. obs.	3337	3238	3109

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 82: Testing Effect of Intervention on Whether They Believe "Fake News is a Problem in the Mainstream Media" with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0455	−0.0449	−0.0564
	(0.0580)	(0.0623)	(0.0752)
R^2	0.0002	0.0005	0.0011
Adj. R^2	−0.0001	0.0002	0.0008
Num. obs.	3336	3237	3108

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 83: Testing Effect of Intervention on Trust in Institutions with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.6346	−0.7537	−1.0348
	(0.5630)	(0.6021)	(0.7237)
R^2	0.0004	0.0010	0.0012
Adj. R^2	0.0001	0.0007	0.0009
Num. obs.	3134	3042	2928

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 84: Testing Effect of Intervention on Trust in CBS with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0634	0.0663	0.0761
	(0.0371)	(0.0398)	(0.0480)
R^2	0.0009	0.0011	0.0017
Adj. R^2	0.0006	0.0007	0.0014
Num. obs.	3337	3238	3109

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 85: Testing Effect of Intervention on Trust in ABC with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0569	0.0652	0.0825
	(0.0371)	(0.0397)	(0.0480)
R^2	0.0007	0.0007	0.0015
Adj. R^2	0.0004	0.0004	0.0012
Num. obs.	3337	3238	3109

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 86: Testing Effect of Intervention on Trust in NBC with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0542	0.0588	0.0738
	(0.0378)	(0.0405)	(0.0489)
R^2	0.0006	0.0009	0.0019
Adj. R^2	0.0003	0.0006	0.0015
Num. obs.	3337	3238	3109

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 87: Testing Effect of Intervention on Trust in CNN with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0338	0.0357	0.0462
	(0.0410)	(0.0440)	(0.0532)
R^2	0.0002	0.0003	0.0010
Adj. R^2	−0.0001	0.0000	0.0007
Num. obs.	3336	3237	3108

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 88: Testing Effect of Intervention on Trust in Fox News with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0108	−0.0162	−0.0285
	(0.0388)	(0.0415)	(0.0501)
R^2	0.0000	0.0005	0.0011
Adj. R^2	−0.0003	0.0001	0.0008
Num. obs.	3336	3237	3108

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

E Results From Covariate-Adjusted Model Testing Hypotheses About Moderators

Table 89: Testing Effect of Intervention Initial level of Affective Polarization Moderator on Effect on Affective Polarization (Covariate-Adjusted)

	Affective Polarization
Treatment	−0.6305
	(1.4245)
Moderator	0.8388***
	(0.0159)
Party ID	−0.2634
	(0.1764)
Race/Ethnicity	1.1935
	(0.7890)
Gender	0.2779
	(0.5622)
Age	0.1347***
	(0.0213)
Trust in Media	−0.4657
	(0.4451)
News consumption (cable news)	0.3519
	(0.1871)
News consumption (print news)	−0.6449**
	(0.2290)
News consumption (talk radio)	0.0024
	(0.2337)
News consumption (news on desktop)	0.5342*
	(0.2249)
Treatment*Moderator	0.0130
	(0.0193)
R^2	0.7224
Adj. R^2	0.7214
Num. obs.	3192

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 90: Testing Effect of Intervention Initial level of Trust In Media (Inverse) Moderator on Effect on Trust In Media (Covariate-Adjusted)

	Trust in Media
Treatment	0.0104
	(0.0356)
Moderator	-0.5641^{***}
	(0.0206)
Party ID	-0.0550^{***}
	(0.0076)
Ideology	-0.0564^{***}
	(0.0075)
Trust of news in newspapers	0.0768^{***}
	(0.0115)
Treatment*Moderator	0.0145
	(0.0223)
R^2	0.6003
Adj. R^2	0.5996
Num. obs.	3335

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

F Results From Covariate-Unadjusted Model Testing Hypotheses Regarding Moderators

Table 91: Testing Effect of Intervention Initial level of Affective Polarization Moderator on Effect on Affective Polarization (Covariate-Adjusted)

	Affective Polarization
Treatment	−0.7565
	(1.4484)
Moderator	0.8626***
	(0.0153)
Treatment*Moderator	0.0130
	(0.0196)
R^2	0.7159
Adj. R^2	0.7156
Num. obs.	3193

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 92: Testing Effect of Intervention Initial level of Trust In Media (Inverse) Moderator on Effect on Trust In Media (Covariate-Adjusted)

	Trust in Media
Treatment	0.0100
	(0.0366)
Moderator	-0.7614^{***}
	(0.0175)
Treatment*Moderator	0.0237
	(0.0228)
R^2	0.5481
Adj. R^2	0.5477
Num. obs.	3337

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

G NewsGuard Indicators of Source Reliability

Figure 4: Different NewsGuard Indicators of Source Quality



H Minimum Detectable Effects for Covariate-adjusted ITT and CACE Models

Table 93: Minimum Detectable Effect of Attitudinal Measures assuming power=0.80 and 95 percent Statistical Significance in both the covariate-adjusted Intent-To-Treat and CACE model using the strongest measure

Variable	MDE (ITT)	MDE (CACE)
Affective Polarization	0.037	0.003
Whether They Believe "Fake News is a Problem"	0.053	0.140
Whether They Believe "Fake News is a Problem in the Mainstream Media"	0.035	0.052
Trust in Institutions	0.046	0.007
Trust in CBS	0.052	0.115
Trust in ABC	0.052	0.115
Trust in NBC	0.050	0.109
Trust in CNN	0.043	0.091
Trust in Fox News	0.046	0.111
Belief in Misinformation about the Black Lives Matter Movement	0.065	0.150
Belief in True Information about the Black Lives Matter Movement	0.065	0.160
Belief in Misinformation about Covid-19	0.062	0.163
Belief in True Information about Covid-19	0.065	0.233
Trust in Media	0.043	0.113

Table 94: Minimum Detectable Effect of Behavioral Measures assuming power=0.80 and 95 percent Statistical Significance in both the covariate-adjusted Intent-To-Treat and CACE model using the strongest measure

Variable	MDE (ITT)	MDE (CACE)
Proportion of News Diet That is Unreliable	0.060	1.349
Proportion of News Diet That is Reliable	0.080	0.576
Count of Unreliable News Consumed	0.072	0.272
Count of Reliable News Consumed	0.050	0.145
Avg. Reliability Score of News Diet	0.080	0.021
Proportion of News Diet That is Unreliable	0.070	1.534
Proportion of News Diet That is Reliable	0.089	0.630
Count of Unreliable News Consumed	0.081	0.379
Count of Reliable News Consumed	0.073	0.204
Avg. Reliability Score of News Diet	0.088	0.024

I Effect of Intervention on Behavioral Measures Using Different Samples of Respondents

Table 95: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Unreliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st) on Different Samples of Respondents by Decile of their Quality of News Consumption Pre-Treatment (Average Reliability Score of News)

Decile	Threshold	ITT Model	CACE Model (Weak Compliance Measure)	CACE Model (Strong Compliance Measure)	Sample Size
Bottom 10 Percent	78.255	-0.021 (0.023)	-0.025 (0.025)	-0.03 (0.029)	78
Bottom 20 Percent	85.347	-0.011 (0.013)	-0.013 (0.014)	-0.015 (0.016)	157
Bottom 30 Percent	87.482	-0.007 (0.009)	-0.008 (0.009)	-0.009 (0.01)	237
Bottom 40 Percent	88.383	-0.006 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.007)	-0.007 (0.008)	315
Bottom 50 Percent	89.167	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.006)	396
Bottom 60 Percent	90	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.005)	493
Bottom 70 Percent	90.773	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.005)	549
Bottom 80 Percent	92.462	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.004)	629
Bottom 90 Percent	95	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.004)	712

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 96: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Reliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st) on Different Samples of Respondents by Decile of their Quality of News Consumption Pre-Treatment (Average Reliability Score of News)

Decile	Threshold	ITT Model	CACE Model (Weak Compliance Measure)	CACE Model (Strong Compliance Measure)	Sample Size
Bottom 10 Percent	78.255	-0.007 (0.03)	-0.004 (0.032)	-0.007 (0.037)	78
Bottom 20 Percent	85.347	0 (0.029)	0.004 (0.031)	0.003 (0.035)	157
Bottom 30 Percent	87.482	0.01 (0.022)	0.011 (0.023)	0.009 (0.026)	237
Bottom 40 Percent	88.383	0.029 (0.019)	0.032 (0.02)	0.029 (0.023)	315
Bottom 50 Percent	89.167	0.034 (0.017)*	0.036 (0.018)*	0.035 (0.02)	396
Bottom 60 Percent	90	0.013 (0.016)	0.015 (0.016)	0.015 (0.018)	493
Bottom 70 Percent	90.773	0.003 (0.015)	0.005 (0.016)	0.004 (0.018)	549
Bottom 80 Percent	92.462	0.001 (0.013)	0.003 (0.014)	0.001 (0.016)	629
Bottom 90 Percent	95	-0.008 (0.013)	-0.007 (0.013)	-0.008 (0.015)	712

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 97: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Unreliable News Consumed with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st) on Different Samples of Respondents by Decile of their Quality of News Consumption Pre-Treatment (Average Reliability Score of News)

Decile	Threshold	ITT Model	CACE Model (Weak Compliance Measure)	CACE Model (Strong Compliance Measure)	Sample Size
Bottom 10 Percent	78.255	0.029 (0.086)	0.02 (0.092)	0.029 (0.107)	79
Bottom 20 Percent	85.347	0.083 (0.068)	0.082 (0.072)	0.1 (0.081)	159
Bottom 30 Percent	87.482	0.076 (0.048)	0.076 (0.051)	0.088 (0.056)	239
Bottom 40 Percent	88.383	0.07 (0.041)	0.073 (0.043)	0.08 (0.049)	317
Bottom 50 Percent	89.167	0.04 (0.035)	0.041 (0.036)	0.044 (0.041)	398
Bottom 60 Percent	90	0.044 (0.03)	0.049 (0.032)	0.054 (0.036)	495
Bottom 70 Percent	90.773	0.037 (0.028)	0.041 (0.03)	0.045 (0.034)	551
Bottom 80 Percent	92.462	0.033 (0.026)	0.037 (0.027)	0.041 (0.031)	631
Bottom 90 Percent	95	0.035 (0.024)	0.039 (0.025)	0.044 (0.029)	714

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 98: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Reliable News Consumed with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st) on Different Samples of Respondents by Decile of their Quality of News Consumption Pre-Treatment (Average Reliability Score of News)

Decile	Threshold	ITT Model	CACE Model (Weak Compliance Measure)	CACE Model (Strong Compliance Measure)	Sample Size
Bottom 10 Percent	78.255	0.038 (0.051)	0.044 (0.056)	0.049 (0.065)	79
Bottom 20 Percent	85.347	0.02 (0.038)	0.023 (0.041)	0.024 (0.046)	159
Bottom 30 Percent	87.482	0.001 (0.034)	0 (0.036)	-0.009 (0.039)	239
Bottom 40 Percent	88.383	0.022 (0.029)	0.022 (0.03)	0.016 (0.034)	317
Bottom 50 Percent	89.167	0.029 (0.025)	0.03 (0.026)	0.025 (0.029)	398
Bottom 60 Percent	90	0.017 (0.023)	0.019 (0.024)	0.022 (0.027)	495
Bottom 70 Percent	90.773	0.009 (0.021)	0.01 (0.022)	0.011 (0.025)	551
Bottom 80 Percent	92.462	0.009 (0.02)	0.01 (0.021)	0.01 (0.023)	631
Bottom 90 Percent	95	-0.002 (0.019)	-0.002 (0.02)	-0.002 (0.022)	714

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 99: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Reliability Score of News Diet with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st) on Different Samples of Respondents by Decile of their Quality of News Consumption Pre-Treatment (Average Reliability Score of News)

Decile	Threshold	ITT Model	CACE Model (Weak Compliance Measure)	CACE Model (Strong Compliance Measure)	Sample Size
Bottom 10 Percent	78.255	3.707 (1.824)*	4.129 (1.891)*	4.415 (2.139)*	78
Bottom 20 Percent	85.347	1.87 (1.201)	2.045 (1.238)	2.15 (1.386)	157
Bottom 30 Percent	87.482	1.19 (0.799)	1.277 (0.811)	1.351 (0.904)	237
Bottom 40 Percent	88.383	1.004 (0.614)	1.083 (0.63)	1.106 (0.714)	315
Bottom 50 Percent	89.167	0.599 (0.516)	0.644 (0.527)	0.63 (0.593)	396
Bottom 60 Percent	90	0.558 (0.423)	0.602 (0.436)	0.653 (0.497)	493
Bottom 70 Percent	90.773	0.44 (0.382)	0.476 (0.396)	0.515 (0.453)	549
Bottom 80 Percent	92.462	0.444 (0.343)	0.477 (0.354)	0.518 (0.404)	629
Bottom 90 Percent	95	0.619 (0.336)	0.655 (0.349)	0.714 (0.4)	712

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 100: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Unreliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st) on Different Samples of Respondents by Decile of their Quality of News Consumption Pre-Treatment (Average Reliability Score of News)

Decile	Threshold	ITT Model	CACE Model (Weak Compliance Measure)	CACE Model (Strong Compliance Measure)	Sample Size
Bottom 10 Percent	78.255	-0.039 (0.027)	-0.039 (0.029)	-0.034 (0.033)	70
Bottom 20 Percent	85.347	-0.025 (0.016)	-0.026 (0.017)	-0.023 (0.019)	141
Bottom 30 Percent	87.482	-0.013 (0.011)	-0.012 (0.011)	-0.011 (0.012)	215
Bottom 40 Percent	88.383	-0.008 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.01)	289
Bottom 50 Percent	89.167	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.008)	369
Bottom 60 Percent	90	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.008 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.006)	459
Bottom 70 Percent	90.773	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.006)	511
Bottom 80 Percent	92.462	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.005)	585
Bottom 90 Percent	95	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.005)	663

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 101: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Reliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st) on Different Samples of Respondents by Decile of their Quality of News Consumption Pre-Treatment (Average Reliability Score of News)

Decile	Threshold	ITT Model	CACE Model (Weak Compliance Measure)	CACE Model (Strong Compliance Measure)	Sample Size
Bottom 10 Percent	78.255	0.036 (0.034)	0.038 (0.036)	0.023 (0.04)	70
Bottom 20 Percent	85.347	0.023 (0.033)	0.025 (0.035)	0.021 (0.039)	141
Bottom 30 Percent	87.482	0.036 (0.026)	0.037 (0.027)	0.033 (0.03)	215
Bottom 40 Percent	88.383	0.039 (0.021)	0.041 (0.022)	0.036 (0.025)	289
Bottom 50 Percent	89.167	0.06 (0.019)**	0.063 (0.02)**	0.063 (0.022)**	369
Bottom 60 Percent	90	0.034 (0.018)	0.036 (0.019)	0.035 (0.021)	459
Bottom 70 Percent	90.773	0.024 (0.017)	0.026 (0.018)	0.023 (0.02)	511
Bottom 80 Percent	92.462	0.01 (0.016)	0.011 (0.017)	0.007 (0.019)	585
Bottom 90 Percent	95	0.003 (0.015)	0.005 (0.015)	0 (0.018)	663

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 102: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Unreliable News Consumed with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st) on Different Samples of Respondents by Decile of their Quality of News Consumption Pre-Treatment (Average Reliability Score of News)

Decile	Threshold	ITT Model	CACE Model (Weak Compliance Measure)	CACE Model (Strong Compliance Measure)	Sample Size
Bottom 10 Percent	78.255	-0.163 (0.104)	-0.174 (0.112)	-0.189 (0.127)	74
Bottom 20 Percent	85.347	-0.042 (0.072)	-0.044 (0.077)	-0.045 (0.085)	147
Bottom 30 Percent	87.482	0.001 (0.05)	0.001 (0.053)	0.004 (0.059)	226
Bottom 40 Percent	88.383	0.014 (0.04)	0.016 (0.043)	0.021 (0.049)	302
Bottom 50 Percent	89.167	-0.005 (0.033)	-0.006 (0.035)	-0.004 (0.04)	383
Bottom 60 Percent	90	-0.004 (0.028)	-0.005 (0.03)	0.005 (0.034)	479
Bottom 70 Percent	90.773	-0.007 (0.027)	-0.008 (0.028)	-0.001 (0.032)	531
Bottom 80 Percent	92.462	-0.001 (0.024)	-0.001 (0.025)	0.006 (0.029)	608
Bottom 90 Percent	95	0.007 (0.022)	0.007 (0.023)	0.016 (0.026)	687

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 103: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Reliable News Consumed with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st) on Different Samples of Respondents by Decile of their Quality of News Consumption Pre-Treatment (Average Reliability Score of News)

Decile	Threshold	ITT Model	CACE Model (Weak Compliance Measure)	CACE Model (Strong Compliance Measure)	Sample Size
Bottom 10 Percent	78.255	-0.034 (0.094)	-0.044 (0.101)	-0.078 (0.114)	74
Bottom 20 Percent	85.347	-0.045 (0.055)	-0.052 (0.059)	-0.07 (0.065)	147
Bottom 30 Percent	87.482	0.012 (0.05)	0.004 (0.053)	-0.019 (0.056)	225
Bottom 40 Percent	88.383	0.02 (0.043)	0.014 (0.046)	-0.004 (0.051)	300
Bottom 50 Percent	89.167	0.009 (0.039)	0.003 (0.041)	-0.014 (0.046)	379
Bottom 60 Percent	90	0.004 (0.037)	0.002 (0.039)	-0.01 (0.042)	472
Bottom 70 Percent	90.773	0.01 (0.035)	0.007 (0.037)	-0.002 (0.04)	524
Bottom 80 Percent	92.462	0.007 (0.033)	0.004 (0.035)	-0.004 (0.038)	599
Bottom 90 Percent	95	-0.014 (0.031)	-0.016 (0.032)	-0.026 (0.036)	678

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 104: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Reliability Score of News Diet with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st) on Different Samples of Respondents by Decile of their Quality of News Consumption Pre-Treatment (Average Reliability Score of News)

Decile	Threshold	ITT Model	CACE Model (Weak Compliance Measure)	CACE Model (Strong Compliance Measure)	Sample Size
Bottom 10 Percent	78.255	5.863 (1.858)**	5.988 (1.892)**	5.813 (2.066)**	70
Bottom 20 Percent	85.347	3.187 (1.255)*	3.215 (1.284)*	3.22 (1.397)*	141
Bottom 30 Percent	87.482	1.694 (0.855)*	1.655 (0.863)	1.665 (0.948)	215
Bottom 40 Percent	88.383	1.277 (0.677)	1.261 (0.694)	1.281 (0.782)	289
Bottom 50 Percent	89.167	1.194 (0.555)*	1.192 (0.567)*	1.221 (0.63)	369
Bottom 60 Percent	90	0.933 (0.475)	0.941 (0.493)	1.006 (0.55)	459
Bottom 70 Percent	90.773	0.849 (0.435)	0.856 (0.452)	0.921 (0.507)	511
Bottom 80 Percent	92.462	0.711 (0.4)	0.712 (0.414)	0.757 (0.464)	585
Bottom 90 Percent	95	0.648 (0.376)	0.631 (0.391)	0.662 (0.44)	663

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

J Distribution of Pre-Treatment Behavioral Measures

Figure 5: Distribution of Average NewsGuard Reliability Score of Online News Diet (Pre-Treatment)



Figure 6: Distribution of Proportion of Unreliable News in Online News Diet (Pre-Treatment)



Figure 7: Distribution of Count of Visits to Online News Sites Rated by NewsGuard (Max=2,000)(Pre-Treatment)



Figure 8: Distribution of Count of Google Search Referrals to an Online News Sites Rated by NewsGuard (Pre-Treatment)



Figure 9: Distribution of Time Spent on Facebook (Pre-Treatment)



Figure 10: Distribution of Time Spent on Twitter (Pre-Treatment)



K Figure: Effect of Intervention on Attitudinal Measures

Figure 11: This figure presents estimates of the effect of the intervention (with 95% confidence intervals) on our pre-registered attitudinal measures. The effect is reported in standard deviations of that measure (pre-treatment).



L Figure: Proportion of the average daily proportion of unreliable news viewed of the treatment group

Figure 12: This figure presents the average daily proportion of unreliable news viewed by the treatment group across this study (with 95% confidence intervals)



M Non-Pre-Registered Exploratory Results

Older Respondents (55 Plus) - Behavioral Measures (Before July 1st) - Covariate-Adjusted

Table 105: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Unreliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0019	−0.0023	−0.0024
	(0.0036)	(0.0038)	(0.0045)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.8639***	0.8652***	0.8570***
	(0.0563)	(0.0566)	(0.0592)
R^2	0.8241	0.8241	0.8154
Adj. R^2	0.8235	0.8235	0.8147
Num. obs.	577	566	554

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 106: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Reliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0010	0.0012	−0.0054
	(0.0139)	(0.0147)	(0.0169)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.8096***	0.8066***	0.8138***
	(0.0292)	(0.0297)	(0.0286)
R^2	0.6684	0.6642	0.6691
Adj. R^2	0.6673	0.6630	0.6679
Num. obs.	577	566	554

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 107: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Unreliable News Consumed with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0335	0.0336	0.0379
	(0.0277)	(0.0294)	(0.0341)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.8662***	0.8661***	0.8567***
	(0.0284)	(0.0291)	(0.0298)
Log of news viewed	0.0449***	0.0458***	0.0469***
	(0.0088)	(0.0090)	(0.0092)
R^2	0.7310	0.7267	0.7204
Adj. R^2	0.7297	0.7252	0.7189
Num. obs.	589	578	565

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 108: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Reliable News Consumed with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0045	0.0046	−0.0023
	(0.0200)	(0.0212)	(0.0242)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.4333***	0.4309***	0.4287***
	(0.0484)	(0.0497)	(0.0504)
Log of news viewed	0.2520***	0.2526***	0.2566***
	(0.0214)	(0.0222)	(0.0225)
R^2	0.9003	0.8990	0.8998
Adj. R^2	0.8998	0.8985	0.8993
Num. obs.	589	578	565

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 109: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Reliability Score of News Diet with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.5477	0.6496	0.6802
	(0.3718)	(0.3911)	(0.4560)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.8673***	0.8639***	0.8625***
	(0.0362)	(0.0367)	(0.0384)
R^2	0.7264	0.7240	0.7154
Adj. R^2	0.7254	0.7231	0.7144
Num. obs.	577	566	554

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Older Respondents (55 Plus) - Behavioral Measures (After July 1st) - Covariate-Adjusted

Table 110: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Unreliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0015	−0.0012	0.0001
	(0.0045)	(0.0047)	(0.0055)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.8135***	0.8140***	0.8420***
	(0.0698)	(0.0701)	(0.0672)
R^2	0.7526	0.7524	0.7677
Adj. R^2	0.7517	0.7515	0.7668
Num. obs.	542	532	519

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 111: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Reliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0176	0.0195	0.0126
	(0.0149)	(0.0158)	(0.0182)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.8010***	0.8036***	0.8130***
	(0.0309)	(0.0313)	(0.0306)
R^2	0.6312	0.6296	0.6351
Adj. R^2	0.6298	0.6282	0.6337
Num. obs.	542	532	519

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 112: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Unreliable News Consumed with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0105	0.0105	0.0156
	(0.0242)	(0.0255)	(0.0301)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.7430***	0.7502***	0.7461***
	(0.0255)	(0.0260)	(0.0271)
R^2	0.6950	0.6953	0.6870
Adj. R^2	0.6939	0.6942	0.6859
Num. obs.	581	570	556

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 113: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Reliable News Consumed with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0084	−0.0108	−0.0260
	(0.0313)	(0.0330)	(0.0377)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.4810***	0.4817***	0.4779***
	(0.0662)	(0.0671)	(0.0679)
Log of news viewed	0.2028***	0.2024***	0.2099***
	(0.0289)	(0.0293)	(0.0297)
R^2	0.7770	0.7780	0.7813
Adj. R^2	0.7758	0.7767	0.7801
Num. obs.	561	551	538

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 114: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Reliability Score of News Diet with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.4328	0.4748	0.4481
	(0.3862)	(0.4071)	(0.4677)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.7913***	0.7950***	0.8129***
	(0.0448)	(0.0457)	(0.0420)
R^2	0.6856	0.6836	0.6937
Adj. R^2	0.6844	0.6824	0.6925
Num. obs.	542	532	519

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Older Respondents (55 Plus) - Behavioral Measures (Before July 1st) - Covariate-Unadjusted

Table 115: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Unreliable with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0042	0.0045	0.0038
	(0.0091)	(0.0096)	(0.0110)
R^2	0.0003	0.0007	0.0006
Adj. R^2	−0.0014	−0.0010	−0.0011
Num. obs.	592	581	567

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 116: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Reliable with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0177	0.0225	0.0155
	(0.0234)	(0.0247)	(0.0285)
R^2	0.0010	0.0008	0.0004
Adj. R^2	−0.0007	−0.0009	−0.0014
Num. obs.	592	581	567

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 117: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Unreliable News Consumed with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0546	0.0574	0.0702
	(0.0516)	(0.0543)	(0.0624)
R^2	0.0018	0.0024	0.0037
Adj. R^2	0.0002	0.0007	0.0020
Num. obs.	616	604	590

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 118: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Reliable News Consumed with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0955	0.0995	0.1162
	(0.0691)	(0.0726)	(0.0846)
R^2	0.0031	0.0046	0.0008
Adj. R^2	0.0015	0.0029	−0.0009
Num. obs.	616	604	590

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 119: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Reliability Score of News Diet with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.1312	−0.0283	−0.1880
	(0.7196)	(0.7553)	(0.8655)
R^2	0.0001	0.0000	0.0006
Adj. R^2	−0.0016	−0.0017	−0.0012
Num. obs.	592	581	567

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Older Respondents (55 Plus) - Behavioral Measures (After July 1st) - Covariate-Unadjusted

Table 120: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Unreliable with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0038	0.0049	0.0055
	(0.0094)	(0.0099)	(0.0117)
R^2	0.0003	0.0007	−0.0010
Adj. R^2	−0.0015	−0.0011	−0.0029
Num. obs.	574	564	548

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 121: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Reliable with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0419	0.0463	0.0406
	(0.0245)	(0.0257)	(0.0299)
R^2	0.0053	0.0046	0.0034
Adj. R^2	0.0035	0.0028	0.0016
Num. obs.	574	564	548

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 122: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Unreliable News Consumed with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0235	0.0277	0.0384
	(0.0435)	(0.0457)	(0.0531)
R^2	0.0005	0.0010	0.0004
Adj. R^2	−0.0012	−0.0006	−0.0014
Num. obs.	607	596	579

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 123: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Reliable News Consumed with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0473	0.0535	0.0647
	(0.0672)	(0.0704)	(0.0826)
R^2	0.0008	0.0015	0.0023
Adj. R^2	−0.0008	−0.0002	0.0006
Num. obs.	607	596	579

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 124: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Reliability Score of News Diet with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0437	−0.0098	−0.1907
	(0.7154)	(0.7522)	(0.8742)
R^2	0.0000	0.0000	−0.0002
Adj. R^2	−0.0017	−0.0018	−0.0020
Num. obs.	574	564	548

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Older Respondents (35 and Younger) - Behavioral Measures (Before July 1st) - Covariate-Adjusted

Table 125: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Unreliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0105	−0.0108	−0.0121
	(0.0112)	(0.0115)	(0.0130)
R^2	0.0467	0.0402	0.0121
Adj. R^2	0.0284	0.0213	−0.0076
Num. obs.	54	53	52

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 126: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Reliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0559	0.0584	0.0672
	(0.0598)	(0.0625)	(0.0696)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.8455***	0.8477***	0.8382***
	(0.0668)	(0.0664)	(0.0692)
R^2	0.6534	0.6527	0.6336
Adj. R^2	0.6383	0.6373	0.6169
Num. obs.	49	48	47

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 127: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Unreliable News Consumed with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0369	−0.0369	−0.0459
	(0.0850)	(0.0878)	(0.1076)
Firefox Browser1	0.2748*	0.2748*	0.2766*
	(0.1328)	(0.1325)	(0.1306)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.5761**	0.5760**	0.5775**
	(0.1874)	(0.1883)	(0.1901)
R^2	0.4586	0.4539	0.4411
Adj. R^2	0.4285	0.4224	0.4069
Num. obs.	58	56	53

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 128: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Reliable News Consumed with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0888	−0.0938	−0.1088
	(0.1013)	(0.1048)	(0.1208)
Education	0.0739	0.0759	0.0653
	(0.0478)	(0.0484)	(0.0522)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.6801***	0.6801***	0.6729***
	(0.0717)	(0.0715)	(0.0783)
Log of news viewed	0.1342***	0.1357***	0.1364**
	(0.0347)	(0.0353)	(0.0397)
R^2	0.8420	0.8378	0.8216
Adj. R^2	0.8291	0.8243	0.8061
Num. obs.	54	53	51

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 129: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Reliability Score of News Diet with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−2.0415	−2.2301	−2.5858
	(1.5662)	(1.6138)	(1.8464)
R^2	0.0321	0.0311	−0.0405
Adj. R^2	0.0135	0.0121	−0.0613
Num. obs.	54	53	52

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Older Respondents (35 and Younger) - Behavioral Measures (After July 1st) - Covariate-Adjusted

Table 130: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Unreliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0003	0.0003	0.0003
	(0.0006)	(0.0007)	(0.0008)
Chrome Browser1	0.0007	0.0006	0.0005
	(0.0006)	(0.0007)	(0.0009)
Firefox Browser1	−0.0028	−0.0029	−0.0030
	(0.0015)	(0.0015)	(0.0015)
Social Media use	0.0001	0.0001	0.0002
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Race/Ethnicity	0.0007	0.0007	0.0006
	(0.0006)	(0.0007)	(0.0007)
Education	−0.0005	−0.0005	−0.0005
	(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
Gender	0.0002	0.0001	0.0002
	(0.0008)	(0.0009)	(0.0010)
Ideology	0.0005*	0.0005*	0.0005*
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)
News consumption (cable news)	−0.0003	−0.0003	−0.0003
	(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
News consumption (print news)	−0.0005	−0.0005	−0.0005
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
News consumption (public radio)	0.0003	0.0004	0.0004
	(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
News consumption (talk radio)	−0.0001	−0.0001	−0.0000
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0005)
News consumption (news on desktop)	0.0010	0.0010	0.0010
	(0.0006)	(0.0006)	(0.0006)
News consumption (news on mobile)	−0.0006*	−0.0006	−0.0006
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Trust of news in newspapers_sm	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Trust of news in newspapers	0.0002	0.0002	0.0002
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.4806***	0.4801***	0.4803***
	(0.0341)	(0.0345)	(0.0362)
Log of news viewed	0.0006*	0.0006*	0.0006*
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0003)
R^2	0.9871	0.9869	0.9864
Adj. R^2	0.9754	0.9744	0.9727
Num. obs.	39	38	37

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 131: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Reliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.1391	−0.1449	−0.1621
	(0.0724)	(0.0760)	(0.0873)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.8644***	0.8574***	0.8643***
	(0.0632)	(0.0681)	(0.0720)
R^2	0.7552	0.7335	0.6933
Adj. R^2	0.7427	0.7195	0.6767
Num. obs.	42	41	40

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 132: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Unreliable News Consumed with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0106	−0.0104	−0.0133
	(0.0338)	(0.0357)	(0.0448)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.5205**	0.5202**	0.5205**
	(0.1875)	(0.1883)	(0.1893)
R^2	0.5422	0.5395	0.5363
Adj. R^2	0.5242	0.5207	0.5162
Num. obs.	54	52	49

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 133: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Reliable News Consumed with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.2221	−0.2256	−0.2931
	(0.1794)	(0.1851)	(0.2351)
Age-Squared	0.0007*	0.0007*	0.0008*
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0004)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.7345***	0.7249***	0.7434***
	(0.0986)	(0.1041)	(0.1153)
R^2	0.6996	0.6895	0.6616
Adj. R^2	0.6815	0.6700	0.6390
Num. obs.	54	52	49

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 134: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Reliability Score of News Diet with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.8297	−1.2021	−1.5125
	(1.5103)	(1.5408)	(1.7585)
R^2	0.0056	0.0127	−0.0375
Adj. R^2	−0.0175	−0.0108	−0.0628
Num. obs.	45	44	43

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Older Respondents (35 and Younger) - Behavioral Measures (Before July 1st) - Covariate-Unadjusted

Table 135: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Unreliable with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0105	−0.0108	−0.0121
	(0.0112)	(0.0115)	(0.0130)
R^2	0.0467	0.0402	0.0121
Adj. R^2	0.0284	0.0213	−0.0076
Num. obs.	54	53	52

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 136: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Reliable with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0071	0.0138	0.0281
	(0.1057)	(0.1091)	(0.1228)
R^2	0.0001	−0.0001	0.0011
Adj. R^2	−0.0192	−0.0197	−0.0189
Num. obs.	54	53	52

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 137: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Unreliable News Consumed with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0646	−0.0603	−0.0773
	(0.0985)	(0.1017)	(0.1231)
R^2	0.0081	0.0033	−0.0196
Adj. R^2	−0.0088	−0.0142	−0.0384
Num. obs.	61	59	56

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 138: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Reliable News Consumed with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.3748	−0.3280	−0.4479
	(0.3017)	(0.3091)	(0.3446)
R^2	0.0270	0.0257	−0.0484
Adj. R^2	0.0105	0.0086	−0.0679
Num. obs.	61	59	56

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 139: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Reliability Score of News Diet with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−2.0415	−2.2301	−2.5858
	(1.5662)	(1.6138)	(1.8464)
R^2	0.0321	0.0311	−0.0405
Adj. R^2	0.0135	0.0121	−0.0613
Num. obs.	54	53	52

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Older Respondents (35 and Younger) - Behavioral Measures (After July 1st) - Covariate-Unadjusted

Table 140: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Unreliable with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0039	−0.0040	−0.0045
	(0.0047)	(0.0049)	(0.0054)
R^2	0.0385	0.0317	0.0298
Adj. R^2	0.0161	0.0086	0.0062
Num. obs.	45	44	43

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 141: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Reliable with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.1053	−0.1005	−0.0974
	(0.1247)	(0.1297)	(0.1459)
R^2	0.0178	0.0132	−0.0124
Adj. R^2	−0.0051	−0.0103	−0.0371
Num. obs.	45	44	43

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 142: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Unreliable News Consumed with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0026	0.0060	0.0053
	(0.0689)	(0.0710)	(0.0878)
R^2	0.0000	0.0007	0.0009
Adj. R^2	−0.0181	−0.0182	−0.0191
Num. obs.	57	55	52

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 143: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Reliable News Consumed with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.3407	−0.3022	−0.4309
	(0.2464)	(0.2542)	(0.2843)
R^2	0.0270	0.0266	−0.0574
Adj. R^2	0.0094	0.0083	−0.0786
Num. obs.	57	55	52

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 144: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Reliability Score of News Diet with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.8297	−1.2021	−1.5125
	(1.5103)	(1.5408)	(1.7585)
R^2	0.0056	0.0127	−0.0375
Adj. R^2	−0.0175	−0.0108	−0.0628
Num. obs.	45	44	43

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Respondents That Self-Identify as a Republican - Behavioral Measures (Before July 1st) - Covariate-Adjusted

Table 145: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Unreliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0005	−0.0004	−0.0005
	(0.0028)	(0.0030)	(0.0035)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.8631***	0.8632***	0.8643***
	(0.0443)	(0.0442)	(0.0441)
R^2	0.8869	0.8870	0.8878
Adj. R^2	0.8863	0.8864	0.8872
Num. obs.	419	413	402

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 146: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Reliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0134	−0.0133	−0.0134
	(0.0170)	(0.0177)	(0.0205)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.7778***	0.7753***	0.7745***
	(0.0328)	(0.0334)	(0.0345)
R^2	0.6537	0.6489	0.6454
Adj. R^2	0.6520	0.6472	0.6436
Num. obs.	419	413	402

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 147: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Unreliable News Consumed with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0155	0.0206	0.0148
	(0.0286)	(0.0295)	(0.0345)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.8255***	0.8310***	0.8308***
	(0.0365)	(0.0366)	(0.0369)
Log of news viewed	0.0397***	0.0398***	0.0418***
	(0.0074)	(0.0076)	(0.0079)
R^2	0.6906	0.6924	0.6941
Adj. R^2	0.6885	0.6902	0.6918
Num. obs.	438	431	416

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 148: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Reliable News Consumed with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0036	0.0024	−0.0002
	(0.0262)	(0.0271)	(0.0312)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.5536***	0.5610***	0.5283***
	(0.0524)	(0.0546)	(0.0552)
Log of news viewed	0.1856***	0.1821***	0.1951***
	(0.0239)	(0.0250)	(0.0258)
R^2	0.8816	0.8788	0.8783
Adj. R^2	0.8807	0.8779	0.8774
Num. obs.	438	431	416

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 149: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Reliability Score of News Diet with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.3595	0.3687	0.4633
	(0.3478)	(0.3630)	(0.4230)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.7535***	0.7519***	0.7591***
	(0.0736)	(0.0739)	(0.0741)
R^2	0.5759	0.5740	0.5757
Adj. R^2	0.5738	0.5719	0.5736
Num. obs.	419	413	402

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Respondents That Self-Identify as a Republican - Behavioral Measures (After July 1st) - Covariate-Adjusted

Table 150: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Unreliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0004	0.0005	0.0024
	(0.0042)	(0.0043)	(0.0048)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.9188***	0.9189***	0.9205***
	(0.0580)	(0.0580)	(0.0579)
R^2	0.8257	0.8258	0.8316
Adj. R^2	0.8248	0.8249	0.8307
Num. obs.	392	387	375

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 151: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Reliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0006	−0.0009	0.0059
	(0.0187)	(0.0195)	(0.0217)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.7994***	0.7986***	0.8123***
	(0.0307)	(0.0313)	(0.0299)
R^2	0.6381	0.6334	0.6514
Adj. R^2	0.6362	0.6315	0.6495
Num. obs.	392	387	375

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 152: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Unreliable News Consumed with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0151	0.0164	0.0281
	(0.0255)	(0.0264)	(0.0299)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.6651***	0.6710***	0.6720***
	(0.0394)	(0.0394)	(0.0398)
R^2	0.6151	0.6175	0.6278
Adj. R^2	0.6133	0.6157	0.6260
Num. obs.	436	429	414

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 153: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Reliable News Consumed with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0030	0.0050	0.0048
	(0.0425)	(0.0441)	(0.0507)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.5982***	0.5983***	0.5917***
	(0.0688)	(0.0715)	(0.0761)
Log of news viewed	0.1183***	0.1180***	0.1230***
	(0.0324)	(0.0336)	(0.0357)
R^2	0.7193	0.7143	0.7091
Adj. R^2	0.7173	0.7122	0.7069
Num. obs.	418	412	398

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 154: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Reliability Score of News Diet with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.1751	0.1952	0.1146
	(0.3923)	(0.4081)	(0.4652)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.7973***	0.7946***	0.7997***
	(0.0731)	(0.0737)	(0.0742)
R^2	0.5847	0.5830	0.5874
Adj. R^2	0.5825	0.5809	0.5852
Num. obs.	392	387	375

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Respondents That Self-Identify as a Republican - Behavioral Measures (Before July 1st) - Covariate-Unadjusted

Table 155: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Unreliable with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0045	0.0045	0.0043
	(0.0087)	(0.0091)	(0.0107)
R^2	0.0005	0.0006	0.0007
Adj. R^2	−0.0017	−0.0017	−0.0017
Num. obs.	444	437	423

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 156: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Reliable with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0123	0.0095	0.0003
	(0.0290)	(0.0299)	(0.0341)
R^2	0.0004	0.0002	−0.0000
Adj. R^2	−0.0019	−0.0021	−0.0024
Num. obs.	444	437	423

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 157: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Unreliable News Consumed with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0248	0.0257	0.0131
	(0.0481)	(0.0498)	(0.0588)
R^2	0.0005	0.0004	0.0009
Adj. R^2	−0.0016	−0.0017	−0.0014
Num. obs.	467	459	443

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 158: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Reliable News Consumed with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0334	−0.0344	−0.0583
	(0.0859)	(0.0881)	(0.1021)
R^2	0.0003	−0.0001	−0.0009
Adj. R^2	−0.0018	−0.0023	−0.0032
Num. obs.	467	459	443

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 159: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Reliability Score of News Diet with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.1266	−0.0991	−0.0664
	(0.5549)	(0.5758)	(0.6739)
R^2	0.0001	0.0002	0.0002
Adj. R^2	−0.0022	−0.0021	−0.0021
Num. obs.	444	437	423

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Respondents That Self-Identify as a Republican - Behavioral Measures (After July 1st) - Covariate-Unadjusted

Table 160: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Unreliable with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0047	0.0047	0.0060
	(0.0102)	(0.0106)	(0.0124)
R^2	0.0005	0.0005	−0.0002
Adj. R^2	−0.0019	−0.0019	−0.0027
Num. obs.	422	417	401

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 161: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Reliable with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0284	0.0251	0.0274
	(0.0311)	(0.0320)	(0.0368)
R^2	0.0021	0.0019	0.0012
Adj. R^2	−0.0003	−0.0005	−0.0013
Num. obs.	422	417	401

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 162: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Unreliable News Consumed with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0170	0.0158	0.0207
	(0.0384)	(0.0398)	(0.0462)
R^2	0.0004	0.0002	0.0017
Adj. R^2	−0.0018	−0.0020	−0.0006
Num. obs.	460	453	435

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 163: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Reliable News Consumed with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0640	−0.0577	−0.0775
	(0.0808)	(0.0831)	(0.0961)
R^2	0.0013	0.0006	−0.0030
Adj. R^2	−0.0008	−0.0016	−0.0053
Num. obs.	460	453	435

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 164: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Reliability Score of News Diet with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.3306	−0.3108	−0.4806
	(0.6083)	(0.6286)	(0.7333)
R^2	0.0006	0.0005	−0.0012
Adj. R^2	−0.0017	−0.0019	−0.0038
Num. obs.	422	417	401

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Respondents That Self-Identify as a Democrat - Behavioral Measures (Before July 1st) - Covariate-Adjusted

Table 165: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Unreliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0005	−0.0004	−0.0005
	(0.0028)	(0.0030)	(0.0035)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.8631***	0.8632***	0.8643***
	(0.0443)	(0.0442)	(0.0441)
R^2	0.8869	0.8870	0.8878
Adj. R^2	0.8863	0.8864	0.8872
Num. obs.	419	413	402

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 166: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Reliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0134	−0.0133	−0.0134
	(0.0170)	(0.0177)	(0.0205)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.7778***	0.7753***	0.7745***
	(0.0328)	(0.0334)	(0.0345)
R^2	0.6537	0.6489	0.6454
Adj. R^2	0.6520	0.6472	0.6436
Num. obs.	419	413	402

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 167: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Unreliable News Consumed with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0155	0.0206	0.0148
	(0.0286)	(0.0295)	(0.0345)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.8255***	0.8310***	0.8308***
	(0.0365)	(0.0366)	(0.0369)
Log of news viewed	0.0397***	0.0398***	0.0418***
	(0.0074)	(0.0076)	(0.0079)
R^2	0.6906	0.6924	0.6941
Adj. R^2	0.6885	0.6902	0.6918
Num. obs.	438	431	416

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 168: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Reliable News Consumed with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0036	0.0024	−0.0002
	(0.0262)	(0.0271)	(0.0312)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.5536***	0.5610***	0.5283***
	(0.0524)	(0.0546)	(0.0552)
Log of news viewed	0.1856***	0.1821***	0.1951***
	(0.0239)	(0.0250)	(0.0258)
R^2	0.8816	0.8788	0.8783
Adj. R^2	0.8807	0.8779	0.8774
Num. obs.	438	431	416

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 169: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Reliability Score of News Diet with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.3595	0.3687	0.4633
	(0.3478)	(0.3630)	(0.4230)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.7535***	0.7519***	0.7591***
	(0.0736)	(0.0739)	(0.0741)
R^2	0.5759	0.5740	0.5757
Adj. R^2	0.5738	0.5719	0.5736
Num. obs.	419	413	402

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Respondents That Self-Identify as a Democrat - Behavioral Measures (After July 1st) - Covariate-Adjusted

Table 170: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Unreliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0004	0.0005	0.0024
	(0.0042)	(0.0043)	(0.0048)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.9188***	0.9189***	0.9205***
	(0.0580)	(0.0580)	(0.0579)
R^2	0.8257	0.8258	0.8316
Adj. R^2	0.8248	0.8249	0.8307
Num. obs.	392	387	375

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 171: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Reliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0006	−0.0009	0.0059
	(0.0187)	(0.0195)	(0.0217)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.7994***	0.7986***	0.8123***
	(0.0307)	(0.0313)	(0.0299)
R^2	0.6381	0.6334	0.6514
Adj. R^2	0.6362	0.6315	0.6495
Num. obs.	392	387	375

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 172: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Unreliable News Consumed with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0151	0.0164	0.0281
	(0.0255)	(0.0264)	(0.0299)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.6651***	0.6710***	0.6720***
	(0.0394)	(0.0394)	(0.0398)
R^2	0.6151	0.6175	0.6278
Adj. R^2	0.6133	0.6157	0.6260
Num. obs.	436	429	414

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 173: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Reliable News Consumed with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0030	0.0050	0.0048
	(0.0425)	(0.0441)	(0.0507)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.5982***	0.5983***	0.5917***
	(0.0688)	(0.0715)	(0.0761)
Log of news viewed	0.1183***	0.1180***	0.1230***
	(0.0324)	(0.0336)	(0.0357)
R^2	0.7193	0.7143	0.7091
Adj. R^2	0.7173	0.7122	0.7069
Num. obs.	418	412	398

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 174: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Reliability Score of News Diet with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.1751	0.1952	0.1146
	(0.3923)	(0.4081)	(0.4652)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.7973***	0.7946***	0.7997***
	(0.0731)	(0.0737)	(0.0742)
R^2	0.5847	0.5830	0.5874
Adj. R^2	0.5825	0.5809	0.5852
Num. obs.	392	387	375

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Respondents That Self-Identify as a Democrat - Behavioral Measures (Before July 1st) - Covariate-Unadjusted

Table 175: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Unreliable with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0045	0.0045	0.0043
	(0.0087)	(0.0091)	(0.0107)
R^2	0.0005	0.0006	0.0007
Adj. R^2	−0.0017	−0.0017	−0.0017
Num. obs.	444	437	423

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 176: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Reliable with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0123	0.0095	0.0003
	(0.0290)	(0.0299)	(0.0341)
R^2	0.0004	0.0002	−0.0000
Adj. R^2	−0.0019	−0.0021	−0.0024
Num. obs.	444	437	423

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 177: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Unreliable News Consumed with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0248	0.0257	0.0131
	(0.0481)	(0.0498)	(0.0588)
R^2	0.0005	0.0004	0.0009
Adj. R^2	−0.0016	−0.0017	−0.0014
Num. obs.	467	459	443

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 178: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Reliable News Consumed with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0334	−0.0344	−0.0583
	(0.0859)	(0.0881)	(0.1021)
R^2	0.0003	−0.0001	−0.0009
Adj. R^2	−0.0018	−0.0023	−0.0032
Num. obs.	467	459	443

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 179: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Reliability Score of News Diet with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.1266	−0.0991	−0.0664
	(0.5549)	(0.5758)	(0.6739)
R^2	0.0001	0.0002	0.0002
Adj. R^2	−0.0022	−0.0021	−0.0021
Num. obs.	444	437	423

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Respondents That Self-Identify as a Democrat - Behavioral Measures (After July 1st) - Covariate-Unadjusted

Table 180: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Unreliable with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0047	0.0047	0.0060
	(0.0102)	(0.0106)	(0.0124)
R^2	0.0005	0.0005	−0.0002
Adj. R^2	−0.0019	−0.0019	−0.0027
Num. obs.	422	417	401

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 181: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Reliable with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0284	0.0251	0.0274
	(0.0311)	(0.0320)	(0.0368)
R^2	0.0021	0.0019	0.0012
Adj. R^2	−0.0003	−0.0005	−0.0013
Num. obs.	422	417	401

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 182: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Unreliable News Consumed with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0170	0.0158	0.0207
	(0.0384)	(0.0398)	(0.0462)
R^2	0.0004	0.0002	0.0017
Adj. R^2	−0.0018	−0.0020	−0.0006
Num. obs.	460	453	435

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 183: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Reliable News Consumed with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0640	−0.0577	−0.0775
	(0.0808)	(0.0831)	(0.0961)
R^2	0.0013	0.0006	−0.0030
Adj. R^2	−0.0008	−0.0016	−0.0053
Num. obs.	460	453	435

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 184: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Reliability Score of News Diet with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.3306	−0.3108	−0.4806
	(0.6083)	(0.6286)	(0.7333)
R^2	0.0006	0.0005	−0.0012
Adj. R^2	−0.0017	−0.0019	−0.0038
Num. obs.	422	417	401

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Respondents That Self-Identify as Neither a Democrat or Republican - Behavioral Measures (Before July 1st) - Covariate-Adjusted

Table 185: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Unreliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0110	−0.0109	−0.0101
	(0.0236)	(0.0243)	(0.0289)
R^2	0.0025	0.0011	0.0022
Adj. R^2	−0.0063	−0.0078	−0.0069
Num. obs.	116	115	111

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 186: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Reliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0429	0.0434	0.0533
	(0.0322)	(0.0333)	(0.0381)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.8211***	0.8211***	0.8558***
	(0.0613)	(0.0612)	(0.0530)
R^2	0.6566	0.6541	0.6967
Adj. R^2	0.6505	0.6478	0.6911
Num. obs.	115	114	110

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 187: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Unreliable News Consumed with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0584	0.0618	0.0920
	(0.0669)	(0.0690)	(0.0812)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.8480***	0.8452***	0.8163***
	(0.0931)	(0.0933)	(0.0970)
R^2	0.6468	0.6462	0.6127
Adj. R^2	0.6407	0.6400	0.6057
Num. obs.	118	117	113

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 188: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Reliable News Consumed with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0026	−0.0039	0.0026
	(0.0516)	(0.0530)	(0.0621)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.7268***	0.7262***	0.7297***
	(0.0986)	(0.0990)	(0.0998)
Log of news viewed	0.0974*	0.0981*	0.0998*
	(0.0446)	(0.0448)	(0.0445)
R^2	0.8273	0.8275	0.8252
Adj. R^2	0.8227	0.8228	0.8203
Num. obs.	117	116	112

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 189: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Reliability Score of News Diet with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	1.2078	1.2361	1.2949
	(0.8507)	(0.8778)	(1.0111)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.8370***	0.8379***	0.8256***
	(0.0730)	(0.0729)	(0.0754)
R^2	0.7156	0.7150	0.7177
Adj. R^2	0.7105	0.7099	0.7124
Num. obs.	115	114	110

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Respondents That Self-Identify as Neither a Democrat or Republican - Behavioral Measures (After July 1st) - Covariate-Adjusted

Table 190: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Unreliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0060	−0.0058	−0.0036
	(0.0201)	(0.0207)	(0.0252)
R^2	0.0009	0.0000	0.0017
Adj. R^2	−0.0081	−0.0090	−0.0077
Num. obs.	114	113	108

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 191: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Reliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0471	−0.0495	−0.0600
	(0.0383)	(0.0399)	(0.0479)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.8207***	0.8167***	0.8451***
	(0.0568)	(0.0578)	(0.0506)
R^2	0.6508	0.6457	0.6694
Adj. R^2	0.6442	0.6390	0.6629
Num. obs.	109	108	104

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 192: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Unreliable News Consumed with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0315	−0.0319	−0.0230
	(0.0570)	(0.0590)	(0.0712)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.6976***	0.6980***	0.6808***
	(0.0719)	(0.0724)	(0.0755)
R^2	0.6290	0.6276	0.6100
Adj. R^2	0.6224	0.6208	0.6027
Num. obs.	115	114	110

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 193: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Reliable News Consumed with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0180	−0.0241	−0.0884
	(0.0801)	(0.0824)	(0.0872)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.8194***	0.8212***	0.8481***
	(0.0507)	(0.0506)	(0.0487)
R^2	0.7552	0.7581	0.7895
Adj. R^2	0.7509	0.7537	0.7856
Num. obs.	115	114	110

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 194: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Reliability Score of News Diet with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.6040	0.6152	0.4907
	(1.7568)	(1.8100)	(2.0759)
R^2	0.0013	0.0001	0.0022
Adj. R^2	−0.0076	−0.0089	−0.0073
Num. obs.	114	113	108

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Respondents That Self-Identify as Neither a Democrat or Republican - Behavioral Measures (Before July 1st) - Covariate-Unadjusted

Table 195: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Unreliable with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0110	−0.0109	−0.0101
	(0.0236)	(0.0243)	(0.0289)
R^2	0.0025	0.0011	0.0022
Adj. R^2	−0.0063	−0.0078	−0.0069
Num. obs.	116	115	111

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 196: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Reliable with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0537	−0.0603	−0.0673
	(0.0660)	(0.0679)	(0.0802)
R^2	0.0058	0.0088	0.0097
Adj. R^2	−0.0029	0.0001	0.0006
Num. obs.	116	115	111

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 197: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Unreliable News Consumed with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0514	0.0587	0.1199
	(0.1200)	(0.1233)	(0.1363)
R^2	0.0017	0.0047	−0.0038
Adj. R^2	−0.0068	−0.0039	−0.0128
Num. obs.	119	118	114

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 198: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Reliable News Consumed with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0001	0.0017	0.0720
	(0.1508)	(0.1553)	(0.1801)
R^2	0.0000	0.0000	0.0004
Adj. R^2	−0.0085	−0.0086	−0.0085
Num. obs.	119	118	114

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 199: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Reliability Score of News Diet with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.5911	0.6007	0.2114
	(1.7251)	(1.7762)	(2.0372)
R^2	0.0013	0.0003	−0.0002
Adj. R^2	−0.0075	−0.0085	−0.0094
Num. obs.	116	115	111

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Respondents That Self-Identify as Neither a Democrat or Republican - Behavioral Measures (After July 1st) - Covariate-Unadjusted

Table 200: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Unreliable with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0060	−0.0058	−0.0036
	(0.0201)	(0.0207)	(0.0252)
R^2	0.0009	0.0000	0.0017
Adj. R^2	−0.0081	−0.0090	−0.0077
Num. obs.	114	113	108

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 201: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Reliable with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0843	−0.0914	−0.1073
	(0.0660)	(0.0679)	(0.0828)
R^2	0.0144	0.0174	0.0012
Adj. R^2	0.0056	0.0086	−0.0082
Num. obs.	114	113	108

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 202: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Unreliable News Consumed with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0098	−0.0061	0.0404
	(0.1046)	(0.1076)	(0.1223)
R^2	0.0001	−0.0002	−0.0045
Adj. R^2	−0.0085	−0.0089	−0.0136
Num. obs.	118	117	112

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 203: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Reliable News Consumed with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0215	0.0184	0.0309
	(0.1476)	(0.1519)	(0.1798)
R^2	0.0002	0.0007	0.0011
Adj. R^2	−0.0084	−0.0080	−0.0079
Num. obs.	118	117	112

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 204: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Reliability Score of News Diet with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.6040	0.6152	0.4907
	(1.7568)	(1.8100)	(2.0759)
R^2	0.0013	0.0001	0.0022
Adj. R^2	−0.0076	−0.0089	−0.0073
Num. obs.	114	113	108

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Respondents With Higher than The Median Level of Digital Literacy - Behavioral Measures (Before July 1st) - Covariate-Adjusted

Table 205: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Unreliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0049	−0.0050	−0.0054
	(0.0036)	(0.0038)	(0.0043)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.8064***	0.8063***	0.7902***
	(0.0713)	(0.0714)	(0.0761)
R^2	0.8225	0.8220	0.8103
Adj. R^2	0.8216	0.8210	0.8093
Num. obs.	386	379	370

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 206: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Reliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0012	0.0020	0.0038
	(0.0185)	(0.0191)	(0.0215)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.7928***	0.7895***	0.7857***
	(0.0339)	(0.0345)	(0.0354)
R^2	0.6663	0.6605	0.6618
Adj. R^2	0.6645	0.6587	0.6600
Num. obs.	386	379	370

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 207: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Unreliable News Consumed with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0568	0.0591	0.0669
	(0.0304)	(0.0316)	(0.0362)
Age-Squared	0.0000***	0.0000***	0.0000***
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.8223***	0.8252***	0.8142***
	(0.0366)	(0.0372)	(0.0378)
Log of news viewed	0.0505***	0.0523***	0.0538***
	(0.0092)	(0.0095)	(0.0099)
R^2	0.7588	0.7575	0.7492
Adj. R^2	0.7563	0.7550	0.7465
Num. obs.	403	395	384

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 208: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Reliable News Consumed with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0089	−0.0124	−0.0188
	(0.0294)	(0.0305)	(0.0340)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.4465***	0.4464***	0.4525***
	(0.0570)	(0.0579)	(0.0584)
Log of news viewed	0.2292***	0.2291***	0.2291***
	(0.0252)	(0.0258)	(0.0265)
R^2	0.8476	0.8415	0.8439
Adj. R^2	0.8464	0.8403	0.8427
Num. obs.	403	395	384

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 209: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Reliability Score of News Diet with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.3890	0.2946	0.3310
	(0.4195)	(0.4260)	(0.4812)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.7852***	0.8015***	0.7947***
	(0.0512)	(0.0483)	(0.0518)
R^2	0.6913	0.7120	0.6968
Adj. R^2	0.6897	0.7104	0.6951
Num. obs.	386	379	370

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Respondents With Higher than The Median Level of Digital Literacy - Behavioral Measures (After July 1st) - Covariate-Adjusted

Table 210: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Unreliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0072	−0.0074	−0.0067
	(0.0050)	(0.0051)	(0.0057)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.7564***	0.7566***	0.7900***
	(0.0910)	(0.0910)	(0.0884)
R^2	0.7530	0.7531	0.7712
Adj. R^2	0.7516	0.7516	0.7699
Num. obs.	353	348	338

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 211: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Reliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0052	0.0064	0.0033
	(0.0212)	(0.0217)	(0.0238)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.7660***	0.7633***	0.7705***
	(0.0355)	(0.0361)	(0.0354)
R^2	0.6074	0.6019	0.6119
Adj. R^2	0.6051	0.5996	0.6096
Num. obs.	353	348	338

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 212: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Unreliable News Consumed with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0055	−0.0068	−0.0011
	(0.0263)	(0.0270)	(0.0314)
Age-Squared	0.0000***	0.0000***	0.0000***
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.6812***	0.6889***	0.6832***
	(0.0454)	(0.0462)	(0.0472)
R^2	0.7000	0.7030	0.6937
Adj. R^2	0.6977	0.7007	0.6912
Num. obs.	397	390	377

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 213: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Reliable News Consumed with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0126	−0.0133	−0.0422
	(0.0484)	(0.0497)	(0.0547)
Age	0.0073***	0.0073***	0.0064**
	(0.0019)	(0.0020)	(0.0020)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.4028***	0.3981***	0.4128***
	(0.0735)	(0.0736)	(0.0741)
Log of news viewed	0.1983***	0.2003***	0.2038***
	(0.0317)	(0.0319)	(0.0328)
R^2	0.6837	0.6752	0.6893
Adj. R^2	0.6803	0.6717	0.6858
Num. obs.	378	372	361

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 214: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Reliability Score of News Diet with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.9398	0.8315	0.9245
	(0.5177)	(0.5203)	(0.5676)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.7544***	0.7765***	0.8068***
	(0.0657)	(0.0625)	(0.0549)
R^2	0.6076	0.6372	0.6603
Adj. R^2	0.6053	0.6351	0.6583
Num. obs.	353	348	338

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Respondents With Higher than The Median Level of Digital Literacy - Behavioral Measures (Before July 1st) - Covariate-Unadjusted

Table 215: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Unreliable with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0094	0.0101	0.0092
	(0.0103)	(0.0106)	(0.0117)
R^2	0.0018	0.0024	0.0025
Adj. R^2	−0.0007	−0.0001	−0.0001
Num. obs.	407	399	389

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 216: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Reliable with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0260	−0.0274	−0.0398
	(0.0313)	(0.0321)	(0.0360)
R^2	0.0017	0.0021	0.0018
Adj. R^2	−0.0008	−0.0004	−0.0008
Num. obs.	407	399	389

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 217: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Unreliable News Consumed with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0812	0.0933	0.0979
	(0.0581)	(0.0600)	(0.0678)
R^2	0.0043	0.0071	0.0074
Adj. R^2	0.0020	0.0048	0.0050
Num. obs.	432	423	411

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 218: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Reliable News Consumed with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0221	−0.0138	−0.0128
	(0.0869)	(0.0888)	(0.1009)
R^2	0.0001	−0.0003	−0.0008
Adj. R^2	−0.0022	−0.0027	−0.0033
Num. obs.	432	423	411

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 219: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Reliability Score of News Diet with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.4786	−0.5288	−0.5786
	(0.7629)	(0.7871)	(0.8751)
R^2	0.0009	0.0014	0.0015
Adj. R^2	−0.0016	−0.0011	−0.0010
Num. obs.	407	399	389

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Respondents With Higher than The Median Level of Digital Literacy - Behavioral Measures (After July 1st) - Covariate-Unadjusted

Table 220: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Unreliable with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0074	0.0079	0.0086
	(0.0113)	(0.0115)	(0.0132)
R^2	0.0010	0.0013	0.0008
Adj. R^2	−0.0016	−0.0014	−0.0020
Num. obs.	376	371	360

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 221: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Reliable with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0037	−0.0027	−0.0159
	(0.0333)	(0.0339)	(0.0383)
R^2	0.0000	0.0000	−0.0007
Adj. R^2	−0.0026	−0.0027	−0.0035
Num. obs.	376	371	360

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 222: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Unreliable News Consumed with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0378	0.0458	0.0491
	(0.0490)	(0.0504)	(0.0571)
R^2	0.0014	0.0021	0.0006
Adj. R^2	−0.0011	−0.0003	−0.0019
Num. obs.	413	406	392

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 223: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Reliable News Consumed with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0246	−0.0059	−0.0184
	(0.0846)	(0.0860)	(0.0981)
R^2	0.0002	−0.0001	−0.0012
Adj. R^2	−0.0022	−0.0026	−0.0038
Num. obs.	413	406	392

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 224: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Reliability Score of News Diet with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.2860	−0.3695	−0.4384
	(0.8398)	(0.8577)	(0.9625)
R^2	0.0003	0.0007	−0.0008
Adj. R^2	−0.0024	−0.0020	−0.0036
Num. obs.	376	371	360

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Respondents With Lower than The Median Level of Digital Literacy - Behavioral Measures (Before July 1st) - Covariate-Adjusted

Table 225: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Unreliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0032	0.0029	0.0035
	(0.0040)	(0.0042)	(0.0050)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.9737***	0.9788***	0.9796***
	(0.0614)	(0.0627)	(0.0629)
R^2	0.8408	0.8419	0.8415
Adj. R^2	0.8400	0.8411	0.8406
Num. obs.	395	388	378

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 226: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Reliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0119	−0.0101	−0.0143
	(0.0180)	(0.0192)	(0.0223)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.8044***	0.8020***	0.8176***
	(0.0330)	(0.0336)	(0.0323)
R^2	0.6535	0.6491	0.6620
Adj. R^2	0.6517	0.6473	0.6601
Num. obs.	395	388	378

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 227: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Unreliable News Consumed with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0311	0.0344	0.0369
	(0.0314)	(0.0332)	(0.0391)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.9151***	0.9127***	0.9099***
	(0.0325)	(0.0336)	(0.0345)
R^2	0.6794	0.6732	0.6692
Adj. R^2	0.6779	0.6716	0.6676
Num. obs.	425	417	405

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 228: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Reliable News Consumed with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0039	−0.0020	0.0041
	(0.0271)	(0.0290)	(0.0340)
Age	0.0039**	0.0040**	0.0036**
	(0.0013)	(0.0013)	(0.0013)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.5804***	0.5773***	0.5620***
	(0.0491)	(0.0498)	(0.0515)
Log of news viewed	0.1757***	0.1766***	0.1845***
	(0.0243)	(0.0246)	(0.0254)
R^2	0.8787	0.8778	0.8766
Adj. R^2	0.8775	0.8765	0.8754
Num. obs.	410	403	391

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 229: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Reliability Score of News Diet with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.5443	0.7158	0.8194
	(0.4889)	(0.5156)	(0.6069)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.8416***	0.8354***	0.8383***
	(0.0493)	(0.0506)	(0.0514)
R^2	0.6807	0.6766	0.6758
Adj. R^2	0.6791	0.6749	0.6741
Num. obs.	395	388	378

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Respondents With Lower than The Median Level of Digital Literacy - Behavioral Measures (After July 1st) - Covariate-Adjusted

Table 230: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Unreliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0018	−0.0015	−0.0002
	(0.0051)	(0.0055)	(0.0063)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.8840***	0.8870***	0.8883***
	(0.0767)	(0.0784)	(0.0784)
R^2	0.7541	0.7536	0.7608
Adj. R^2	0.7528	0.7522	0.7595
Num. obs.	375	368	358

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 231: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Reliable with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0070	−0.0066	−0.0070
	(0.0202)	(0.0218)	(0.0251)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.7733***	0.7757***	0.7944***
	(0.0385)	(0.0392)	(0.0387)
R^2	0.5896	0.5876	0.6092
Adj. R^2	0.5874	0.5853	0.6070
Num. obs.	375	368	358

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 232: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Unreliable News Consumed with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0134	0.0146	0.0271
	(0.0281)	(0.0301)	(0.0345)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.7159***	0.7174***	0.7196***
	(0.0368)	(0.0385)	(0.0394)
R^2	0.6225	0.6141	0.6201
Adj. R^2	0.6207	0.6122	0.6181
Num. obs.	409	401	390

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 233: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Reliable News Consumed with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0087	−0.0118	−0.0022
	(0.0418)	(0.0445)	(0.0523)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.6500***	0.6557***	0.6582***
	(0.0663)	(0.0668)	(0.0701)
Log of news viewed	0.1077**	0.1052**	0.1085**
	(0.0326)	(0.0329)	(0.0340)
R^2	0.7566	0.7575	0.7574
Adj. R^2	0.7548	0.7556	0.7554
Num. obs.	394	387	376

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 234: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Reliability Score of News Diet with Covariate-Adjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.1882	0.2505	0.2323
	(0.5113)	(0.5494)	(0.6436)
Pre-Treatment Value	0.7774***	0.7829***	0.7842***
	(0.0584)	(0.0603)	(0.0619)
R^2	0.6287	0.6244	0.6209
Adj. R^2	0.6267	0.6224	0.6188
Num. obs.	375	368	358

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Respondents With Lower than The Median Level of Digital Literacy - Behavioral Measures (Before July 1st) - Covariate-Unadjusted

Table 235: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Unreliable with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0071	−0.0078	−0.0096
	(0.0107)	(0.0114)	(0.0136)
R^2	0.0012	0.0007	0.0017
Adj. R^2	−0.0012	−0.0018	−0.0009
Num. obs.	409	402	390

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 236: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Reliable with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0100	0.0176	0.0146
	(0.0309)	(0.0328)	(0.0384)
R^2	0.0002	0.0006	0.0003
Adj. R^2	−0.0022	−0.0019	−0.0023
Num. obs.	409	402	390

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 237: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Unreliable News Consumed with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0109	−0.0130	−0.0092
	(0.0563)	(0.0595)	(0.0694)
R^2	0.0001	0.0000	−0.0001
Adj. R^2	−0.0022	−0.0023	−0.0025
Num. obs.	430	422	409

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 238: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Reliable News Consumed with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0068	0.0071	0.0095
	(0.0845)	(0.0895)	(0.1042)
R^2	0.0000	0.0002	−0.0003
Adj. R^2	−0.0023	−0.0022	−0.0027
Num. obs.	430	422	409

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 239: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Reliability Score of News Diet with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (Before July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.6825	0.9061	0.9529
	(0.8920)	(0.9395)	(1.0996)
R^2	0.0015	0.0028	0.0009
Adj. R^2	−0.0010	0.0003	−0.0017
Num. obs.	409	402	390

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Respondents With Lower than The Median Level of Digital Literacy - Behavioral Measures (After July 1st) - Covariate-Unadjusted

Table 240: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Unreliable with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0107	−0.0108	−0.0116
	(0.0105)	(0.0112)	(0.0133)
R^2	0.0029	0.0015	0.0077
Adj. R^2	0.0004	−0.0011	0.0051
Num. obs.	401	394	380

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 241: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Proportion of News Diet That is Reliable with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.0207	0.0277	0.0341
	(0.0309)	(0.0331)	(0.0391)
R^2	0.0011	0.0007	0.0005
Adj. R^2	−0.0014	−0.0019	−0.0021
Num. obs.	401	394	380

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 242: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Unreliable News Consumed with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0175	−0.0205	−0.0066
	(0.0458)	(0.0486)	(0.0572)
R^2	0.0004	−0.0002	0.0002
Adj. R^2	−0.0020	−0.0026	−0.0023
Num. obs.	430	422	408

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 243: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Count of Reliable News Consumed with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	−0.0383	−0.0304	−0.0327
	(0.0806)	(0.0855)	(0.1013)
R^2	0.0005	−0.0001	0.0001
Adj. R^2	−0.0018	−0.0025	−0.0024
Num. obs.	430	422	408

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 244: Testing the Effect of the Intervention on Reliability Score of News Diet with Covariate-Unadjusted Models (HC2 Robust standard errors) (After July 1st)

	Intent-To-Treat (ITT)	CACE (Model 1)	CACE (Model 2)
Treatment	0.6270	0.7670	0.7094
	(0.8945)	(0.9551)	(1.1335)
R^2	0.0013	0.0011	0.0017
Adj. R^2	−0.0012	−0.0015	−0.0009
Num. obs.	401	394	380

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

N Balance Table and Density Plots

Table 245: Average Statistics for Behavioral Measures of Online News Quality by Control and Treatment Group in Each Time Period of Interest

	Control	Treatment	Difference (Treatment - Control)
Number of respondents	356	612	NA
Average Proportion of News Viewed that was "Unreliable" (Pre-Treatment period)	0.03143	0.03185	0.00042
Average Proportion of News Viewed that was "Unreliable" (Treatment period)	0.03054	0.03107	0.00053
Average Proportion of News Viewed that was "Unreliable" (Post-Treatment period)	0.03215	0.03057	-0.00159
Average Proportion of News Viewed that was "Reliable" (Pre-Treatment period)	0.67395	0.67513	0.00118
Average Proportion of News Viewed that was "Reliable" (Treatment period)	0.68441	0.67339	-0.01103
Average Proportion of News Viewed that was "Reliable" (Post-Treatment period)	0.70309	0.71415	0.01106
Average Count (log) of News Viewed that was "Unreliable" (Pre-Treatment period)	0.32938	0.31552	-0.01386
Average Count (log) of News Viewed that was "Unreliable" (Treatment period)	0.34902	0.37805	0.02902
Average Count (log) of News Viewed that was "Unreliable" (Post-Treatment period)	0.24346	0.25249	0.00904
Average Count (log) of News Viewed that was "Reliable" (Pre-Treatment period)	1.73446	1.73218	-0.00228
Average Count (log) of News Viewed that was "Reliable" (Treatment period)	1.85586	1.83976	-0.0161
Average Count (log) of News Viewed that was "Reliable" (Post-Treatment period)	1.56868	1.5284	-0.04028
Average Reliability Score of News Viewed (Pre-Treatment period)	87.7879	87.52881	-0.25909
Average Reliability Score of News Viewed (Treatment period)	87.26024	87.31514	0.0549
Average Reliability Score of News Viewed (Post-Treatment period)	87.11857	87.29597	0.17741

Figure 13: This figure presents the distribution of the proportion of news sites viewed that are unreliable among respondents in the treatment and control groups with a vertical dashed line indicating the mean reliability score for each group. Panels A, B, and C present these distributions during the pre-treatment period, treatment period, and post-treatment period respectively.

(a) Pre-Treatment Period



(b) Treatment Period



(c) Post-Treatment Period



Figure 14: This figure presents the distribution of the proportion of news sites viewed that are reliable among respondents in the treatment and control groups with a vertical dashed line indicating the mean reliability score for each group. Panels A, B, and C present these distributions during the pre-treatment period, treatment period, and post-treatment period respectively.

(a) Pre-Treatment Period



(b) Treatment Period



(c) Post-Treatment Period



Figure 15: This figure presents the distribution of the count of unreliable news sites viewed (log) among respondents in the treatment and control groups with a vertical dashed line indicating the mean reliability score for each group. Panels A, B, and C present these distributions during the pre-treatment period, treatment period, and post-treatment period respectively.

(a) Pre-Treatment Period



(b) Treatment Period



(c) Post-Treatment Period



Figure 16: This figure presents the distribution of the count of reliable news sites viewed (log) among respondents in the treatment and control groups with a vertical dashed line indicating the mean reliability score for each group. Panels A, B, and C present these distributions during the pre-treatment period, treatment period, and post-treatment period respectively.

(a) Pre-Treatment Period



(b) Treatment Period



(c) Post-Treatment Period



O Results From Covariate-Adjusted Models using Mobile Behavioral Data

Figure 17: This figure presents estimates of the effect of the intervention (ITT, with 95% confidence intervals) on our mobile behavioral measures in the two periods after treatment assignment: before July 1 when the NewsGuard extension was freely available and the two-week period between July 1–13 when the NewsGuard extension was disabled. The effect is reported in standard deviations of that measure (pre-treatment).



Table 246: This table presents the number and percentage of the Pulse sample for which we collected only web tracking data from their desktop/laptop, only from their mobile device, or from both

	Desktop/Laptop Only	Mobile Only	Both Desktop/Laptop and Mobile
Percentage of Pulse Sample	79.14	18.24	2.62
Number of Respondents	937	216	31

References

Dancey, Logan. 2012. "The consequences of political cynicism: How cynicism shapes citizens' reactions to political scandals." *Political Behavior* 34(3):411–423.

Eady, Gregory, Rich Bonneau, Jonathan Nagler and Joshua Tucker. N.d. "News Sharing on Social Media: Mapping the Ideology of News Media Content, Citizens, and Politicians." . Forthcoming.

Guess, Andrew, Brendan Nyhan and Jason Reifler. 2019. "National News, Local Lens? Findings from the 2019 Poynter Media Trust Survey." *October* 21:2019.

Marbach, Moritz and Dominik Hangartner. 2020. "Profiling Compliers and Noncompliers for Instrumental-Variable Analysis." *Political Analysis* pp. 1–10.

Miller, Joanne M, Kyle L Saunders and Christina E Farhart. 2016. "Conspiracy endorsement as motivated reasoning: The moderating roles of political knowledge and trust." *American Journal of Political Science* 60(4):824–844.

Pew. 2017. "American Trends Panel." *Pew* .
URL: *https://www.journalism.org/2017/05/10/media-attitudes-methodology/*